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The Committee for Economic Development is an 
independent research and policy organization of over 
200 business leaders and educators. CED is non-profit, 
non-partisan, and non-political. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady economic growth 
at high employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increased productivity and living standards, greater 
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and an 
improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must have the ap-
proval of trustees on the Research and Policy Commit-
tee. This committee is directed under the bylaws, which 
emphasize that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each instance is to 
be from the standpoint of the general welfare and not 
from that of any special political or economic group.” 
The committee is aided by a Research Advisory Board 
of leading social scientists and by a small permanent 
professional staff. 
The Research and Policy Committee does not attempt 
to pass judgment on any pending specific legislative 
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration 
of the objectives set forth in this statement and of the 
best means of accomplishing those objectives. 
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions, 
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. The research 
is undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors 
chosen for their competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee participates in 
the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the trust-
ees on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve or 
disapprove a policy statement, and they share with  
the Research and Policy Committee the privilege of 
submitting individual comments for publication.
The recommendations presented herein are those of the 
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee 
and the responsible subcommittee. They are not necessarily 
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee 
members, advisors, contributors, staff members, or others 
associated with CED. 
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Purpose of This Statement
Responsible projections of federal expenditures and 
revenues indicate an impending fiscal crisis. This 
prospective explosion of future budget deficits is  
driven primarily by rapidly rising health care costs  
and the aging of our society. As this report shows,  
even very substantial restraint in the growth of  
federal expenditures is unlikely, in itself, to restore  
fiscal stability.
In the longer term, far-reaching structural reforms 
in our health care system and federal entitlement 
programs are not only necessary, but inevitable. Tax 
revenues cannot rise to cover expenditures rising to 30, 
40, and 50 percent of GDP without severely damaging 
the economy. But, even in conjunction with substantial 
spending restraint, tax revenues will also have to rise to 
restore a sustainable fiscal policy.
In The Emerging Budget Crisis: Urgent Fiscal Choices 
(May 2005), CED argued that the fiscal problem is 
structural and, as such, requires a structural solution. 
Although in that statement we focused primarily 
on federal spending, any comprehensive approach 
requires an examination of the revenue side as well. 
CED believes we must broaden the current tax 
reform discussion to include the critical issue of 
revenue sufficiency. This policy statement therefore 
focuses on reforms of the tax system. We specifically 
address deficiencies in the current income tax, which 
is complex, inefficient, inequitable, and inadequate for 
raising needed revenues.
Our recommendations outline a new tax framework, 
including a value-added tax (VAT) to supplement an 
improved and simplified income tax. CED believes 
that the nation needs both a VAT and an income 
tax—the former to ensure sufficient revenues to pay 
for government, the latter to ensure the progressivity of 
the overall tax system. We recommend modifications 
to the income tax to reduce its complexity (including 
repeal of the alternative minimum tax, or AMT) and 
improve its efficiency and equity, as well as changes in 
the tax-writing and budget processes. We believe this 
new tax framework can help avert the impending fiscal 
crisis and create a sound foundation for future growth 
and prosperity. 
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The U.S. fiscal system faces two major problems. The 
first is an impending fiscal crisis; large and growing 
Federal budget deficits will soon threaten our economic 
growth and living standards. The second problem is 
that the tax system has become unnecessarily complex 
and riddled with inequitable special preferences that 
distort our market economy. These two problems are 
closely related: an ineffective tax system cannot raise 
the revenues required to finance Federal expenditures 
and restrain budget deficits without placing heavy 
burdens on the economy and society. We need a 
simpler, more efficient, and fairer tax system as the 
foundation of a more productive economy and a sound 
long-term fiscal policy. 
The fiscal crisis ahead will be driven largely by the 
impact of escalating health care costs on Medicare and 
Medicaid expenditures, but also by the demographics 
of an aging society. These cost pressures will be so intense 
that fundamental changes in our health care system, and 
correspondingly large reductions in the growth of Medicare 
and Medicaid spending, are unavoidable. Taxes cannot 
rise to cover federal expenditures that rise exponentially 
to 30, 40, and 50 percent of GDP. Tax increases of 
this magnitude are politically infeasible and would 
overwhelm the economy.
However, expenditure reductions alone will not be 
enough. Congressional Budget Office projections 
indicate that even aggressive and painful changes 
to reduce expenditures in Medicare and Medicaid, 
with other spending restraints, are unlikely to restore 
fiscal balance if federal revenues remain at historical 
levels. As CED argued in its 2003 budget statement, 
the nation must undertake a budgetary “war on all 
fronts” by reforming entitlement programs, reducing 
discretionary (annually appropriated) spending, and 
Executive Summary
by raising additional revenues. CED has previously 
made recommendations for changes in Social Security 
and the health care system and continues to work on 
these critical expenditure issues.a This policy statement, 
however, focuses on revenues and the tax system. 
In theory, additional revenues could be provided 
simply by raising income tax rates. However, the 
current income tax system is complex, inefficient, and 
inequitable. The proliferation of special tax preferences 
confronts the taxpayer with bewildering complexity 
and impairs compliance with and enforcement of the 
law. These preferences are also inequitable and impair 
economic efficiency and growth. Raising the tax rates 
of this dysfunctional system would compound existing 
distortions and disincentives, further damaging the 
economy. 
The income tax therefore should be reformed by 
eliminating, reducing, and consolidating special tax 
preferences to the extent feasible. This will make the 
system simpler, fairer, and more efficient, promoting 
economic productivity and growth. However, even an 
improved income tax is unlikely to meet our revenue 
needs, because there are major political and policy 
constraints on how far we can go in eliminating such 
preferences and broadening the income tax base. Such 
a program, however desirable, is therefore unlikely 
to raise large amounts of additional revenue. Indeed, 
a simplification and base-broadening program that 
repeals the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT)—the 
most complex and problematic feature of the current 
system—is likely to raise less revenue than the  
present system.
a See CED, Fixing Social Security (Washington, D.C.: CED, 1997) 
and CED, A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for 
Business (Washington, D.C.: CED, 2002).
In addition, raising income tax rates will prove a 
counterproductive long-term strategy for increasing 
revenues, as globalization makes capital more mobile. 
Domestic production and jobs will become more 
likely to move offshore, and foreign capital less likely 
to be invested here, as income tax rates (and especially 
corporate rates) rise. Under these circumstances, the 
burden of capital income taxation will increasingly be 
shifted to workers.
We therefore need a new revenue source to supplement 
an improved income tax. CED proposes a national 
value-added tax (VAT), combined with modifications 
to the income tax (including a refundable low-income 
credit) that will shield the poor from the VAT and 
preserve overall tax progressivity. The United States 
needs both a VAT and a simpler, progressive income 
tax—the former to raise additional revenues on a very 
broad base in an economically neutral manner, the 
latter to preserve the fairness of the tax system.
This new hybrid tax framework would greatly improve 
the U.S. fiscal outlook. Budget projections show that, 
under current tax policies that produce insufficient 
revenue, even quite severe spending restraint (as 
described below) is unlikely to restore fiscal balance 
or even a sustainable fiscal policy. In comparison, 
however, the additional revenues raised in the CED tax 
framework, if combined with similar spending restraint, 
would produce budget balance or surpluses for a 
number of years. The new revenues would not only 
reduce deficits and debt directly, but, by forestalling 
an explosion in interest costs, allow us to “buy time” to 
restructure health care and other expenditure programs. 
The proposed CED tax framework would raise net 
revenues by about 3.7 percent of GDP; an increase in 
income tax rates of 35-40 percent would be required to 
produce equivalent revenues. 
CED also makes recommendations to improve the 
taxation of capital income, reform the legislative 
process to improve tax and budget policies, and provide 
the resources and support to the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) required to strengthen compliance  
and enforcement.
Taken together, CED’s recommendations involve 
major changes in our tax system. However, unlike some 
“fundamental tax reforms” that involve scrapping the 
income tax entirely and thereby creating enormous 
problems for the transition to a new system, this 
“hybrid” system would be more feasible politically and 
could be more easily implemented. The fundamental 
structure of the income tax would not change, and the 
journey to a VAT, which would admittedly require 
many difficult choices, would take place on the well-
prepared ground that over 100 other nations have 
covered in recent decades.
Summary of  
CED’s Recommendations
1.	 Eliminate	and	Reduce	Tax	Preferences,	Simplify	
the	Tax	System,	and	Broaden	the	Tax	Base.	
We should remove unnecessary complexities and 
reduce or eliminate tax preferences that do not 
have a compelling rationale. Remaining preferences 
should be consolidated and simplified, and in some 
cases deductions should be converted into credits. 
Consolidation of low-income and education 
credits and the reform of saving preferences offer 
important opportunities for simplification.
2.	 Phase	In	a	Broad-Based	10	Percent	Value-
Added	Tax	(VAT)	To	Supplement	the	Income	
Tax. A VAT would provide additional revenues to 
help meet the impending fiscal crisis and to allow 
lower income tax rates (and thus smaller economic 
distortions) than would otherwise be required. 
The VAT base should be as broad as possible, to 
enhance both economic neutrality and revenues. 
The VAT’s distributional effects should be 
addressed by modifications to the income tax, not 
by exclusions of particular goods and services from 
the VAT.
3.	 Modify	the	Income	Tax	To	Protect	Low-Income	
Households	and	Support	Progressivity.	A 
common objection to a VAT is that it is regressive. 
However, the income tax can be modified to 
address this problem by restructuring and 
expanding a refundable low-income tax credit, 
modifying income tax rates for those with tax 
liability, and increasing the standard deduction to 
raise the tax-entry threshold.
4.	 Repeal	the	Individual	and	Corporate	Alternative	
Minimum	Taxes.	With AMT repeal, those 
targeted provisions of the AMT that discourage 
aggressive tax shelters should be incorporated 
into the regular income tax. We do not need two 
parallel tax systems to reduce tax preferences and 
promote equity. However, the introduction of a 
VAT and repeal of the AMT must be accompanied 
by changes in the income tax rate structure, standard 
deductions, and low-income credits to support the 
progressivity of the overall tax system.
5.	 Rationalize	Capital	Income	Taxation	by	
Integrating	the	Individual	and	Corporate	Income	
Taxes,	Narrowing	the	Differential	Treatment	
of	Ordinary	Income	and	Capital	Gains,	and	
Modifying	the	Estate	and	Gift	Taxes. We 
should tax capital income once, but only once, at 
rates that approximate those on other forms of 
income. The differential between the top rate on 
ordinary income and that on capital gains should 
be narrowed to reduce incentives for arbitrage and 
tax shelters. The estate tax should be retained. One 
option would be to continue in 2010 and thereafter 
the scheduled 2009 exemption of $3.5 million ($7 
million for couples) and top rate of 45 percent, 
with the exemption indexed for inflation.
6.	 Improve	the	Processes	for	Making	Tax	and	
Budget	Policies. Process changes are essential to 
help protect a new tax framework against renewed 
onslaughts of complexity and revenue erosion. 
In addition, rules for budget control should 
be restored and new requirements should be 
established for Congressional consideration of the 
long-term effects of fiscal policy.
7.	 Provide	the	Internal	Revenue	Service	with	
Political	Support	and	Resources required to 
support the integrity and revenue-raising capacity 
of the tax system.
This policy statement was completed before Hurricane Katrina struck 
New Orleans and the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005.  In addition to its 
immense toll in human life and suffering, the hurricane will have large 
effects on the Federal budget.  In the near term, early estimates indi-
cate an increase in expenditures (and the budget deficit) for fiscal years 
2005-2006 of $100-200 billion. There are also likely to be significant 
longer-term effects, in addition to the inevitable interest costs of the 
larger near-term expenditures. Costs of programs for relief, relocation, 
and rebuilding are likely to continue for some years.  In addition, it is 
likely that expenditures to prepare more adequately for natural disasters 
will be permanently higher.  Although it is not possible to incorporate 
such long-term effects into projections at this time, CED believes that 
these budgetary effects strongly underline the central message of 
this policy statement: that a new revenue source will be needed to 
supplement expenditure controls in averting a future fiscal crisis.

There is widespread agreement that the U.S. tax 
system needs reform. This becomes evident when our 
fiscal practices are evaluated against the principles that 
should govern them. CED believes that our tax system  
should be:
• Capable of raising sufficient revenue to pay for 
the government expenditures mandated by the 
political process;
• Equitable, according similar treatment to those 
in similar circumstances;
• Economically neutral, allowing market forces to 
allocate resources;
• Progressive, distributing tax burdens according 
to ability to pay;
• Simple and transparent, imposing as little cost 
as possible on taxpayers and government.
These goals, of course, often conflict, requiring 
compromises. Nevertheless, it is evident that the 
current tax system fails all of these tests. We believe 
this failure poses enormous risks for the nation in the 
years ahead. This policy statement analyzes some of the 
reasons for this failure and makes recommendations to 
improve the system. 
The U.S. fiscal system faces two major challenges. 
First, an impending fiscal crisis: federal revenues are 
recovering only modestly from a 45 year low relative 
to the size of the economy, in the face of large budget 
deficits and rising debt burdens. These structural 
deficits, already large and persistent enough to cause 
serious fiscal concern, threaten to explode in the future 
under the pressures of rising health care costs and an 
aging society. As we note below, these pressures will 
ultimately require major structural changes in health 
care and retirement programs to reduce the growth 
of expenditures. But even quite severe expenditure 
restraints are unlikely to prevent a rapid rise in budget 
deficits under current and prospective tax policies. We 
therefore believe that additional revenues also will be 
essential to restore fiscal balance.
The second challenge is a tax system that has become 
riddled with special preferences that are inequitable, 
distort our market economy, are often regressive, and 
make the system complex, burdensome, and expensive. 
These two problems are closely related; a dysfunctional 
tax system cannot raise the revenues required to finance 
federal expenditures and rein in budget deficits without 
jeopardizing the economy and fracturing society. We 
need a simpler, more efficient, and fairer tax system 
as a foundation for a more productive economy. We 
need such a system today. But this need will become 
critical when the retirement of the baby-boomers 
begins to drive federal expenditures on health care and 
retirement much higher toward the end of this decade.
This policy statement first examines the impending 
fiscal crisis, explaining why we must act to meet it, and 
why we must act now. We also show why this crisis 
demands “a war on all fronts,” encompassing both 
comprehensive expenditure reductions and an increase 
in tax revenues, as CED said in Exploding Deficits and 
Declining Growth (2003).1
We then describe the most serious problems of our 
current income tax system and suggest changes in  
tax policy that will ameliorate them. We make three 
broad arguments: 
(1) We must eliminate, reduce, and consolidate special 
tax preferences wherever possible. This will make the 
I. Introduction: Why This Policy Statement?
system simpler, fairer, and more efficient, promoting 
economic productivity and growth. The reduction of 
tax preferences will also broaden the income tax base, 
thereby raising revenues or permitting lower tax rates. 
We make some specific recommendations and provide 
illustrations of other such measures.  
(2) We recognize that realistically there are major 
political and policy constraints on how far Congress is 
likely to go in eliminating preferences and broadening 
the tax base. Therefore, however important such efforts 
are in promoting simplicity, efficiency, and equity, 
they are unlikely to raise large amounts of additional 
revenue. Indeed, a simplification and base-broadening 
program that repeals the Alternative Minimum Tax 
(AMT)—the most complex and problematic feature 
of the current system—may raise less revenue than the 
present system. In addition, continually rising income 
tax rates may endanger domestic production and jobs 
as capital becomes more mobile internationally.
(3) We therefore argue that a new revenue source must 
be developed to supplement an improved income tax. 
Continually raising income tax rates to meet future 
needs would be economically harmful and politically 
unacceptable. We propose a national value-added tax 
(VAT), with modifications to the income tax that 
will preserve overall tax progressivity. We believe that 
the United States needs both a VAT and an income 
tax—the former to raise revenues in an economically 
neutral manner that does not penalize saving, the latter to 
preserve the progressivity of the tax system. We also make 
recommendations to rationalize the taxation of capital 
income, reform the legislative process to improve tax 
and budget policies, and provide the resources and 
support to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) required 
to have an effective and fair tax system.
These goals and recommendations are very far-
reaching. Many will see them as unrealistic, since the 
political barriers to extensive tax reform are notoriously 
obdurate. They will be strenuously opposed by 
those who reject all tax increases, those who would 
continually raise income taxes, and those especially 
favored by the preferences in the current system. The 
acceptance of painful change, however, will increase 
as the reality of destructive and unsustainable deficits 
becomes more apparent. When the fiscal crisis 
overtakes us, major changes in expenditure and tax 
policy, for better or worse, will become inevitable. If we 
do not now think clearly about where we wish to go, we 
won’t get there.
Why We Must Act: The Dimensions of 
the Fiscal Crisis
In 2003 we concluded that the United States confronted 
an extremely large structural federal budget deficit. A 
recent estimate puts the “fiscal gap” between projected 
expenditures and revenues at about 7.1 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) through 2080, assuming we 
continue to follow current policies.a This long-term 
fiscal gap has risen by about 6 percentage points of 
GDP since 2001, an extraordinary deterioration of the 
fiscal outlook.2 
In our 2003 policy statement, we explained why such 
large and growing budget deficits, with the resulting 
burgeoning debt burden, are a threat to our economy 
and society. They will slow and possibly even reverse 
increases in living standards, endanger economic 
stability, force severe cuts in even those federal 
expenditures that foster growth and equity, and transfer 
large fiscal burdens to future generations. While we 
do not repeat those arguments here, they remain a 
compelling rationale for this statement on tax policy.
By far the largest source of the fiscal gap is the growth 
in expenditures on health care in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs, which are projected to rise 
dramatically from 4 percent of GDP today to about  
14-17 percent in 2030.3 These rising federal 
expenditures reflect the escalation of health care 
expenditures generally, as advancing medical 
technology stimulates society’s demand for the benefits 
of that technology and the population ages. Medical 
progress provides great benefits, and substantial 
increases in health care demand and expenditures, both 
public and private, should be expected. But the health 
care delivery system is also economically dysfunctional 
and often does not provide patients or medical 
providers with incentives to reduce costs or restrict 
consumption of relatively low-value services, thereby 
pushing expenditure growth even higher.4 
Public expenditures will also rise as the rapidly 
expanding retiree population presents its claims for 
Social Security and other public pensions. Under the 
current benefit structure, Social Security spending 
will rise from about 4 percent of GDP today to nearly 
6 percent in 2030. Because Medicare, Medicaid, and 
Social Security comprise 43 percent of federal program 
expenditures and are growing so rapidly, major changes 
in their structure and financing ultimately will be not 
only necessary, but inevitable.
As though these alarming pressures on future resources 
didn’t exist, we have chosen to raise the base for future 
spending in the last few years by rapidly increasing 
expenditures. New national security requirements 
are an undeniable reality. But we have also enacted 
prescription drug legislation that greatly raises 
Medicare costs, larger farm subsidies, and sharp 
increases in non-defense appropriations that accounted 
for nearly half of a 56 percent increase in discretionary 
spending during 1999-2004.5 
Recent tax policy has also increased the long-term 
fiscal gap. In 2004, federal revenues fell to 16.3 percent 
of GDP, the lowest level since 1959, and individual 
income tax revenues of 7.0 percent of GDP were the 
II. The Impending Fiscal Crisis
a  A 7.1 percent fiscal gap means that immediate and permanent 
reductions in spending or increases in revenues totaling 7.1 
percent of GDP would be required to maintain the current ratio 
of federal debt to GDP through 2080, so that debt does not grow 
beyond the capacity of the economy to service it.  For assumptions 
behind the estimate, see endnote following.
lowest since 1951. In the near term, the 2001-2004 
tax cuts have raised the 2001-2011 deficits by about 
1½ percent of GDP; in the long term, if extended 
permanently, they contribute about 2 percent of GDP 
to the fiscal gap.6 
The dimensions of the long-term fiscal crisis are 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, which reflect projections 
of revenues, spending, deficits, and debt by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).7 In both figures, 
revenues are assumed to rise over the next few years 
from their unusually low current level to their historical 
average of 18.4 percent of GDP, as a result of the 
“bracket creep” associated with real growth in taxable 
incomes. Revenues are then adjusted to remain at that 
level, presumably through occasional tax reductions, 
consistent with historical experience. 
Two expenditure projections are used to derive 
Figures 1 and 2. In the “historical spending” projection, 
Medicare and Medicaid costs per enrollee grow roughly 
in line with historical experience and defense spending 
conforms to the Administration’s 2004 Future Years 
Defense Program (with allowances for cost risk). 
In the “restrained spending” projection, Medicare 
and Medicaid costs grow much more slowly, as does 
defense spending, as explained in the figures. It is 
essential to recognize that this second path implies very 
substantial, indeed unprecedented, restraints on Medicare 
and Medicaid spending. Two leading health economists 
note that achieving these spending reductions 
would be a “monumental achievement” requiring 
“aggressive action…including some increase in the 
age of eligibility for Medicare, increased cost-sharing, 
selective purchasing, and the application of information 
technology.” Even with such measures, some rationing 
of care would likely prove necessary.8
Under the historical spending projection, the deficit 
explodes and exceeds 10 percent of GDP by 2027 
before rising to even more implausible levels. But even 
under the restrained spending scenario, the deficit rises 
very rapidly, beginning in the next decade, to levels 
unprecedented in peacetime. As Figure 2 shows, with 
revenues at historical levels, both spending projections 
imply an ever-increasing ratio of federal debt to 
GDP, which is unsustainable in the long term. These 
projections, therefore, do not indicate what is “likely to 
happen” in the future. Rather, they show that current 
Figure 1
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fiscal policies are unsustainable and will have to be 
radically altered.
How can we predict confidently from such crude 
projections that radical changes in fiscal policy must be 
made? While five- and ten-year economic and budget 
projections have proven to be notoriously fallible, these 
long-term expenditure projections are likely to be much 
more robust. First, the fundamental factors driving the 
projected rise in expenditures—rapid technological 
change and the rising societal demand for health care 
and the aging of the society—are firmly established, 
even if their effects cannot be measured precisely. 
Second, the long-term budgetary excesses are so large 
that, even if much more optimistic assumptions are 
made, the long-term trends all point in the same 
direction, as Figure 2 indicates. Third, although 
stronger economic growth can ameliorate this dire 
outlook, it is extremely unlikely that even a dramatic 
acceleration of economic growth will allow us to “grow 
our way out” of the problem. CED has estimated that 
to do so, even over the next 50 years, would require a 
50 percent increase in the rate of productivity growth 
(of labor and capital combined).9 This would defy 
historical experience. It would be irresponsible to 
proceed in the belief that radical fiscal policy changes 
can be avoided.
Source: Congressional Budget Office: The Long-Term Budget Outlook, December 2003. 
Both projections assume that tax policy is adjusted such that revenues increase gradually from their current low level of 17.5 percent of 
GDP to their 30-year historical average of 18.4 percent of GDP in 2012 and then continue at that level until 2050. The “historical spend-
ing” projection assumes that Medicare and Medicaid “excess cost growth” (the difference between the growth of costs per enrollee and that 
of per capita GDP) continues at the historical rate of 2.5 percent per year, defense spending follows the Administration’s 2004 Future 
Years Defense Program to 2022 and then grows with inflation, all currently scheduled Social Security benefits are paid, and other spend-
ing remains at its historical share of GDP.  The “restrained spending” projection differs primarily in assuming that Medicare and Medicaid 
“excess cost growth” is only 1.0 percent per year, and that defense spending phases down until 2022 before growing with inflation.  Other 
categories of spending follow the same trends as those in the historical spending projection.
Figure 2
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Why We Must Act  
on All Budgetary Fronts
There are two essential lessons to be drawn from 
Figures 1 and 2:
1. In the long term, fundamental changes in our 
health care system, and correspondingly large 
reductions in the growth of Medicare and 
Medicaid spending, are unavoidable. Taxes cannot 
rise to cover expenditures that rise exponentially to 
30, 40, and 50 percent of GDP. Tax increases of 
this magnitude would overwhelm the economy.
2. Expenditure reductions alone will not be enough. 
At historical revenue levels, even far-reaching 
changes in Medicare and Medicaid that greatly 
moderate their growth would not resolve the 
problem, as the “restrained spending” projection 
shows. Additional revenues will also be necessary.
Faced with this alarming long-term fiscal outlook, 
CED’s 2003 report concluded that the nation must 
undertake a budgetary “war on all fronts” by reforming 
entitlement programs, reducing discretionary (annually 
appropriated) spending, and raising new revenues. 
With regard to entitlement programs, CED previously 
made a proposal to make Social Security permanently 
solvent and recommendations for reforms in the 
pension and health care systems, and is continuing 
work on these issues. 10 This policy statement, however, 
focuses on revenues and the tax system.
One important reason that additional revenues will 
be required is that it will take time to make the public 
and private sector changes required to slow the growth 
of health care expenditures, even if we can agree on 
how to do so.11 No clear direction for doing so is 
apparent today. As CBO has noted, “Most of the 
options to constrain spending that have been proposed 
in the Congress or by health care experts would not 
substantially diminish the upward trajectory of the 
programs’ spending.”12 Without additional revenues, 
deficits would feed on themselves as interest costs and 
debt balloon. (In the historical spending projection, 
interest costs rise nearly 10 times as fast as program 
spending between 2005 and 2030.) This fiscal 
hemorrhaging would make the budget increasingly 
unmanageable and greatly restrict options in the future. 
As shown in Section V below, a timely increase in 
revenues, by forestalling such an explosion of debt, 
would “buy time” for a necessary restructuring of health 
care programs.
In addition to far-reaching changes in health care and 
other entitlement programs, discretionary spending in 
defense, international, and domestic programs must 
also be reined in. The global war on terrorism must 
not become a rationale for relaxing fiscal discipline; 
indeed, the demands it places on our resources 
require more scrutiny, not less. As we said in 2003, 
the defense budget must be cost-effective and focused 
sharply on the new national security situation, and 
homeland security expenditures will require special 
attention. Non-security discretionary programs must 
be examined much more carefully than in the past and 
eliminated or reduced if ineffective. We applaud the 
administration’s attention to ineffective programs in 
its 2006 budget and urge Congress to establish tight 
controls over appropriations.
However, even with greater fiscal discipline, cuts in 
discretionary programs cannot provide long-term 
budgetary savings of the magnitude required. In recent 
decades, the defense budget did provide substantial 
resources, as defense spending fell from about 5½ 
percent of GDP in the early 1980s to 3 percent in 
2000, reflecting both a long-term trend and the end of 
the Cold War. This decline made room in the budget 
for growth in other expenditures, especially Medicare 
and Medicaid. But now that the GDP share of security 
spending is historically low, it is no longer possible to 
“squeeze out” of the defense budget another 2-3 percent 
of GDP. In addition, the global war on terrorism 
now poses an open-ended threat and therefore the 
possibility of greatly enlarged security expenditures. 
Defense and homeland security spending was $333 
billion in 2001; it is likely to be $540 billion in 2006, 
or 4.2 percent of GDP.13 Although the President’s 2006 
budget proposes restraint in some military programs, 
higher security spending for the foreseeable future 
appears likely.
Similarly, domestic and international discretionary 
spending fell from about 4½ percent of GDP in the 
early 1980s to 3.3 percent in 2000. However, like 
defense spending, these programs no longer will 
provide a source of large cost reductions. Non-security 
discretionary programs collectively now account for 
less than 20 percent of total program expenditures, so 
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that extremely large cuts would be required to have a 
significant budget impact. Thus, for instance, even if 
the President’s proposed elimination of more than  
150 programs and a five-year aggregate spending  
freeze (an overall inflation-adjusted reduction of about 
16 percent) were enacted, spending in 2010 would fall 
by less than ½ percent of GDP.14 Yet signals from both 
parties in the Congress indicate that even such limited 
reductions are unlikely. 
There are always ineffective domestic programs that 
can and should be eliminated or reduced. However, 
this category of spending also contains important and 
effective programs that provide for law enforcement, 
environmental protection, public health, investments 
in human, physical, and knowledge resources, and basic 
low-income supports, for which both public demand 
and policy rationale are quite strong. CED has strongly 
supported many such programs, including those for 
early childhood education, basic research, worker 
training, and low-income support. The danger now is 
that automatic and inexorable increases in entitlement 
spending, inadequate tax revenues, and rising 
deficits will crowd out of the budget many programs 
representing the best of the public sector.
Therefore, after examining the budgetary effects of large 
reductions in the growth of spending, and the potential 
for future spending restraint, we believe that additional 
tax revenue will be an inescapable component of any 
responsible long-term fiscal policy. Raising additional 
revenues will be hugely controversial and is certainly 
not part of current tax reform efforts, but it will be 
unavoidable if we are to avert a fiscal crisis.
Why We Must Act Now
Why is action so urgent when the explosion of deficits 
appears some years away? First, the prospect of these 
deficits may begin to produce serious problems long 
before they occur. For example, some foreign central 
banks have already indicated an intent to shift the 
composition of their reserves away from dollars, as 
our exploding international current account deficit 
reached $666 billion (5.7 percent of GDP) in 2004. 
The worsening fiscal outlook could make the rapid 
growth in U.S. borrowing from abroad unsustainable, 
provoking sharp exchange and interest rate reactions 
and recession. Less dramatically, Social Security 
financing shortly will begin to exert pressure on the 
federal budget, as the surplus of contributions over 
outlays shrinks and then disappears, requiring an 
acceleration in federal borrowing. 
Second, today’s policy actions sometimes place large 
burdens on future budgets that are not reflected 
in today’s budget accounting. For example, Roth 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and similar 
proposed “back-loaded” saving incentives produce 
large and irreversible future revenue losses. Finally, as 
noted above, major fiscal policy changes take time to 
legislate and implement, may take years to produce 
their full effects, and often must be phased in gradually 
for reasons of smooth adjustment and fairness. It is 
therefore essential that we address the issues now 
rather than wait for a crisis to drive policy decisions. 
Delayed policy changes will have to be larger and are 
likely to be less carefully considered, more abrupt, and 
less equitable.
As a result, we believe policymakers must act now 
to begin to prepare for the fiscal crisis just ahead. As 
noted above, the long-term fiscal gap has deteriorated 
by an extraordinary 6 percent of GDP since 2001. 
Continuing large deficits in the next few years, even 
if they are not yet exploding, will pile up debt and 
interest costs that will make future policy choices even 
more difficult. Yet the required fiscal restraint does 
not appear likely: national security costs continue 
to mount, domestic spending reductions encounter 
deep resistance, and proposals for additional tax 
cuts proliferate. As we said in our 2003 report, the 
first step in climbing out of a hole is to stop digging. The 
immediate challenge, therefore, is to stop, and reverse 
where possible, this fiscal hemorrhaging and restore 
confidence and credibility to our fiscal policy. Then, 
for the longer term, we must put in place both major 
spending restraints and a tax system that can raise the 
revenue necessary to pay for government in an efficient 
and equitable manner. Our recommendations in 
Section IV provide a framework to accomplish this.
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The current income tax is complex, impairs economic 
efficiency and growth, and is in certain respects 
inequitable. It imposes heavy administrative burdens. 
And it fails to raise sufficient revenue to deal with the 
impending fiscal crisis. We briefly address each of these 
problems and conclude that a new revenue source will be 
necessary in the future if we are to avoid exploding deficits 
or unacceptably large increases in income tax rates.
The Current Income Tax is Complex, 
Opaque, and Unstable
An effective tax system would be reasonably simple 
and transparent to limit the costs of tax collection, 
compliance, and planning. In sharp contrast, our 
income tax code has become an ever-growing thicket  
of provisions that benefit particular economic 
interests or groups of citizens. The income tax code 
and regulations contain about 7 million words. The 
instruction booklet for the ubiquitous Form 1040 
has increased from four pages in 1940 to 48 pages in 
1976 and to 128 pages for the 2004 tax year. The IRS 
estimates that the time required to complete an average 
individual tax return has risen from about 17 hours in 
1988 to over 28 hours today.15 
The U.S. Treasury now lists 146	“income tax 
expenditures,” which are special exclusions, exemptions, 
deductions, credits, preferential tax rates, and deferrals 
of liability relative to a “normal” tax baseline patterned 
on a comprehensive income tax.16 Tax incentives are 
now major instruments of U.S. economic and social 
policy and provide a large share of federal support 
for many policy goals. This is not going to change. 
However, because of political pressures that favor tax 
expenditures over direct expenditures, tax preferences 
now have often become our “first resort” for policies 
in education, health, housing, and other areas. These 
146 tax expenditures reduce revenues for fiscal year 
2005 by roughly $726 billion—6 percent of GDP 
and 65 percent of individual and corporate income 
tax revenues.a A number of tax expenditures were 
eliminated or reduced by the tax reform of 1986; 
since then, however, tax expenditures have again risen 
relative to GDP, and the proportion directed at social 
goals such as health, retirement security, education, 
and support for low-income households, has increased 
relative to those directed at business-related goals.  
(See Figure 3)
Often there are several preferences for the same 
activity, such as home ownership, energy production, 
education, saving, or health care, with the result 
that the provisions overlap and employ different 
definitions, criteria for eligibility, and other rules, 
creating unnecessary complexity that makes planning, 
compliance, and enforcement difficult. Moreover, these 
provisions not only accumulate, but many also change 
frequently, making the tax code a “moving target” for 
business and financial planning. (The instability of the 
tax law, of course, provides continuing opportunities 
for policymakers to reaffirm their concern for the needs 
of their constituents and supporters.) The American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA), originally intended 
to provide a simple remedy for the violation of 
III. Improving Presidential Campaign FinanceWhat’s Wrong With he Income Tax?
a Because the estimated revenue loss associated with each tax ex-
penditure assumes the continuation of all other tax expenditures, 
and such provisions often interact, adding up the individual tax 
expenditure revenue costs provides only a very rough approxima-
tion of their combined revenue cost.  Nevertheless, unless such 
interaction effects change significantly over time, the aggregates 
should provide a reasonably good picture of the trends of tax 
expenditures over time.
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international trade rules by an export subsidy, became 
a monument to complexity, not least in its redefinition 
of “manufacturing” to encompass extraction of oil, gas, 
minerals, and timber, movie production, and coffee 
roasting.17 Just as a new tax reform commission was 
appointed to consider tax simplification, the President’s 
2006 budget proposed 29 new tax incentives for saving, 
health care, charitable giving, education, housing, 
telecommuting, energy production, and other activities, 
as well as the extension of eight other expiring 
preferences.18
In recent years, the practice of enacting “temporary” tax 
changes that are scheduled to expire in the near future 
has become especially troublesome. While temporary 
tax changes may be justified when used for economic 
stabilization, most of the recent changes have no such 
rationale. Although for many years a group of such 
provisions (the “extenders”) was routinely set to expire 
and then extended, this unfortunate practice has 
recently been greatly expanded. 
Very large expiring provisions have been used to distort 
budget totals and evade budget rules by producing 
grossly understated estimates of the revenue losses 
associated with new tax legislation. The most notable 
example, of course, is the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), all of 
whose tax cuts were set to expire after 2010. But the 
tax legislation of 2002-2004 has added to the problem. 
At present, all tax provisions scheduled to expire 
during 2005-2015, if extended, will reduce revenues by 
about $2.1 trillion during 2006-2015.19 
A special, and increasingly important, source of 
complexity is the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), 
levied on both individuals and corporations. The AMT 
was enacted in 1969, and revised in 1978, to curb 
tax shelters among a small number of high-income 
individuals and corporations. (Enactment followed the 
disclosure by Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr that 155 
wealthy families paid no income tax.) It is essentially a 
“parallel” income tax that disallows certain preferences 
Figure 3
TRENDS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES: 1980-2004
(Percent of GDP)
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in the regular income tax and has a different set of 
exemptions and rates. Taxpayers are required to pay  
the higher of the tax liabilities computed under the  
two systems. 
Historically, relatively few individual taxpayers have 
been affected by the AMT, and only 1.4 percent of 
filers paid the AMT in 2001. But the AMT’s structure 
is not indexed to inflation, and this, in combination 
with recent reductions in the regular income tax, will 
soon force the AMT upon millions of taxpayers for 
whom it was never intended and who know nothing of 
tax shelters. Indeed, less than 10 percent of its revenue 
now comes from its tax shelter provisions. Rather, the 
AMT’s burden will fall increasingly on the middle 
class, and especially on married filers with children, as 
their personal exemptions, standard and most itemized 
deductions, and personal credits are disallowed under 
the AMT. It is estimated that 31 percent of individual 
taxpayers will pay the AMT in 2010 under current 
law and that those with cash incomes of $50,000 to 
$100,000 will then pay 11.2 percent of AMT revenues, 
compared with 0.7 percent in 2004. The AMT would 
then produce about $105 billion, or 10.6 percent of 
individual income tax revenues.20 
The AMT not only forces taxpayers to compute two 
tax liabilities, but also is intrinsically complex. The 
National Taxpayer Advocate and the IRS have identi-
fied the AMT as one of the most difficult pieces of 
the tax code to comply with and administer, and the 
National Taxpayer Advocate and IRS Oversight Board 
have recommended its repeal.21 Among other things, 
capital gains and depreciation rules under the AMT 
are exceptionally difficult to navigate, and the interac-
tions between the regular tax system and the AMT 
are highly nuanced—making tax planning particularly 
costly. This complexity will become especially burden-
some for middle-class taxpayers, who will have relative-
ly small AMT liabilities, but will face many of the same 
complexities as those with higher incomes who already 
must make heavy use of professional tax planning  
and preparation. 22
Tax provisions for the support of low-income families 
present another area of troublesome complexity. Such 
families face bewildering and often conflicting rules 
in applying for assistance through the dependent 
exemption, head-of-household filing status, child 
tax credit (and its refundable component), child and 
dependent care tax credit, and Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). This complexity has probably also 
contributed to difficulties in enforcement, fraud, and 
abuse. Different definitions of “earned income” create 
undue confusion, although recent legislation has 
created a uniform definition of a “qualifying child” for 
such preferences. There are also multiple, unnecessary 
computations involved.23 Such complexity places heavy 
compliance burdens on low-income households and 
thereby undermines the effectiveness of these provisions. 
It is estimated that $1.75 billion in Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) refunds in 1999 were diverted to tax 
preparation, filing, and high-cost refund loans.24
Preferences for higher education present families and 
students with bewildering choices among 529 plans, 
education saving bonds, Coverdell education saving 
accounts, Hope Scholarship Credits, Lifetime Learning 
Credits, and itemized deductions for higher education 
expenses. These preferences have different rules for 
eligibility and often use conflicting definitions of 
qualifying expenses.
Complexity also abounds in the taxation of capital 
gains, where there are too many rates and too many 
rules. Income from realized capital assets is taxed 
preferentially relative to other income, and this 
preferential rate system is a mind-numbingly complex 
hodge-podge, with rates depending on the year in 
which the gain is realized, the type of asset sold, the 
owner’s other income, when the asset was purchased, 
and how long it was held. Many calculations therefore 
are required to compute the tax on long-term 
gains; in 2004 most taxpayers required a worksheet 
computation of 19 lines, and those selling collectibles 
and depreciated real estate needed one of 37 lines. The 
system will become even more complex in 2009, when 
different rates will be applied to certain gains on assets 
held for more than five years.25
Tax Preferences Impair Economic 
Efficiency and Growth
The proliferation of these tax preferences not only 
produces great complexity, but reduces output, income, 
and living standards in three important ways.
First, such preferences reduce revenues and increase 
the budget deficit. Large and sustained budget 
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deficits reduce national saving and investment, curtail 
economic growth, shift the costs of consumption to 
future generations, and increase international economic 
imbalances, instability and tensions. These effects have 
been analyzed by CED in previous policy statements.26
Second, these preferences reduce taxable income and 
thereby require higher tax rates. Because the costs that 
any tax imposes on the economy increase exponentially 
with the tax rate, these higher rates on a smaller base 
reduce national output and Americans’ incomes.27
Finally, tax subsidies distort decisions in the 
marketplace by changing relative prices of products, 
services, and economic activities. As a result, 
individuals and firms produce and consume additional 
goods and services that are less valuable than their 
more heavily taxed alternatives. Housing enjoys 
enormous preferential treatment in our tax system; the 
10 major housing tax expenditures provide subsidies 
of about $158 billion in 2005. The largest single tax 
expenditure, the open-ended exclusion of employer 
contributions for medical insurance premiums and care, 
which encourages the use of unnecessarily expensive 
health plans, is worth $102	billion.28 Aid to state and 
local governments, provided principally through the 
deductibility of income, property and other taxes and 
the exclusion of interest on their bonds, amounts to 
about $89 billion. Sixteen	separate preferences for 
education provide about $18 billion. The 11	energy 
tax expenditures generate subsidies for this sector 
of $4 billion, while agriculture, timber, and mineral 
extraction combined receive about $2.5 billion.29 
(These estimates exclude the effects of the recently-
enacted energy and other 2005 legislation.)
The distortions of prices and economic resources 
produced by these preferences can have pernicious, if 
unintended, consequences. It is hardly a coincidence 
that prices have risen especially rapidly for heavily 
subsidized activities such as housing, health care, 
and higher education.30 The expansion of tax credits 
and other subsidies for college attendance have made 
possible rapid increases in tuition and other costs, 
which ultimately undermine the goal of making 
college more affordable; recent research suggests that 
tax credits for higher education have not increased 
college attendance, although they have expanded 
choices for some students.31 The mortgage interest 
deduction, capital gains exclusion, deduction for 
property taxes, and other housing preferences have 
helped drive unprecedented increases in housing prices, 
making homes unaffordable for the young and less-
affluent, while bestowing windfall gains on current 
owners.32 The open-ended employer deduction for 
health insurance and the structure of many insurance 
plans have made employees and their health service 
providers insensitive to costs and the consequences of 
their choices. This has helped fuel rapid increases in 
the prices and utilization of health care, making health 
insurance less affordable and increasing the number  
of uninsured.33
Several of the largest income tax preferences are for 
saving; the exclusion of employer and individual 
pension contributions and earnings confers tax benefits 
of about $114 billion. In principle, taxes on saving 
induce individuals to consume more today (relative 
to the future) than they would in a tax-free capital 
market, thereby distorting their consumption choices 
and reducing their saving.a However, saving preferences 
as currently designed probably do not significantly 
raise national saving and economic growth.34 These 
provisions are poorly designed in several respects. 
First, they do not in fact reward saving; they reward 
deposits in tax-preferred accounts—which may reflect 
transfers from taxable accounts, gifts, bequests, or 
other sources, rather than actual new saving. A recent 
analysis indicates that the tax benefits alone from these 
deposits—a fraction of the putative new “saving”—now 
exceed all personal saving.35 Second, these saving 
preferences provide very large (and costly) incentives 
for high-income individuals, most of whom would save 
in any case, and much smaller incentives for lower-
income individuals, who save little and need stronger 
inducements.36 If the goal is to increase individual 
saving, this is a very costly and inefficient approach. 
Finally, even if such preferences increase personal saving, 
there would be no increase in national saving unless the 
new personal saving exceeded the loss of government 
revenues from the tax preference.37 
As Figure 4 shows, personal saving has fallen steadily 
for many years, in spite of the proliferation and 
expansion of saving incentives. Recently, with the 
a  However, lower tax rates on saving may discourage saving by  
allowing individuals to reach a future income target with less sav-
ing at the lower rates.  In addition, saving incentives may indirectly 
reduce labor market efficiency if the higher income tax rates then 
required to raise revenue induce individuals to reduce work effort. 
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reappearance of large federal budget deficits, public 
saving and national saving have resumed their decline. 
As CED has long argued, our instruments for raising 
personal saving are weak; the most effective policy for 
increasing national saving is to raise public saving by 
reducing the budget deficit.38 
Whatever their impact on national saving, these saving 
preferences are more numerous and complex than 
necessary. In addition to employer plans, we now have 
401(k)-type plans and deductible, non-deductible, and 
Roth IRAs with different rules and complex conversion 
provisions, as well as Keogh plans, an additional saving 
credit for lower-income taxpayers, and specialized 
saving incentives such as Education IRAs and Health 
Savings Accounts.
The corporate income tax poses especially difficult 
problems for economic efficiency. The corporate tax 
is riddled with subsidies including (among others) 
preferences for energy and other extractive industries, 
graduated corporate rates, the exemption of private 
activity bonds, tax credits for non-conventional fuels, 
the credit union exemption, the exclusion of interest 
on life insurance savings, timber subsidies, employee 
stock ownership plans, and accelerated depreciation 
of machinery and equipment. As noted above, the 
AJCA of 2004 extends the list even further, especially 
regarding subsidies for “domestic production activities.”
Tax preferences, of course, may be warranted as a 
matter of public policy when they are the most effective 
instruments for achieving public goals.39 Strong 
arguments can be made that without preferential 
treatment the resources devoted to some “public goods” 
such as basic research, education, and retirement 
saving, will be less than socially optimal. But this is a 
slippery slope; most activities and groups of potential 
beneficiaries are eager to claim such status. The most 
likely outcome, as noted above, is the distortion of 
prices and misallocation of resources. Since very 
large amounts of resources are involved and many 
preferences are ineffectively targeted, there is a 
strong case for selectively eliminating, reducing, and 
simplifying tax preferences. This should be done as a 
matter of sound policy, even though, as noted below, we 
cannot realistically expect large additional revenues as 
a result.
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Tax Expenditures Are Often 
Inequitable
There is widespread agreement in the United States 
on the basic principles of a fair tax system. Horizontal 
and vertical equity have been widely accepted as the 
key standards of fairness: Americans generally agree in 
principle that those in similar economic circumstances 
should be treated the same (horizontal equity) and 
that tax liability should increase according to ability to 
pay (vertical equity). Of course, in application, these 
principles leave room for large disagreements.
Horizontal equity has been undermined by many of 
the special preferences littered throughout the tax 
system. While determining a person’s “circumstances” 
is by no means an exact science, one widely accepted 
measure is income—the increase in an individual’s 
power to consume.40 By this definition, the principle 
of horizontal equity dictates that people with similar 
incomes should be treated equally. This implies that 
the tax system should not discriminate among sources 
of income or the recipients of that income. The many 
tax preferences for specific sources and recipients of 
income—whether the preferential treatment of capital 
gains, the exclusion of certain income earned abroad, 
or the exclusion of some social security and veteran’s 
benefits—violate this principle. 
Many tax expenditures also violate the principle of 
progressivity. A principal purpose of preferences such 
as the mortgage interest deduction, the deduction 
for higher education expenses, and the exclusion 
of employer contributions for medical insurance is 
presumably to make housing, education, and medical 
care more affordable for households of limited means. 
Yet, tax preferences that reduce taxable income—
deductions, exclusions, and deferrals of income—
confer much larger benefits on high-income households 
than on the middle- and lower-income households 
for whom affordability is most important. This design 
is not only regressive, but inefficient, because each 
additional dollar spent on education, housing, health 
insurance, or other “preferred” activity is subsidized 
at a higher rate, the higher the taxpayer’s tax bracket. 
Thus, the subsidy for one dollar of education saving 
for a 35 percent bracket taxpayer is 2.3 times as large 
as that for someone in the 15 percent bracket. There is 
little rationale for such “upside-down” subsidies except 
when the purpose is to adjust taxable income to reflect 
more accurately the taxpayer’s ability to pay, which is 
not generally the case. For those preferences that must 
be retained, converting such exclusions or deductions 
into equal-percentage credits for all taxpayers would 
improve both progressivity and efficiency.41 
Another serious problem arises from the income-based 
phase-outs of benefits that have arisen from attempts 
to increase the progressivity and reduce the revenue 
costs of tax expenditures. Phase-outs of exemptions, 
deductions, and credits increase both complexity 
and economic inefficiency. To calculate eligibility 
for (among other preferences) the EITC, the child 
tax credit, IRAs, and the deduction for student loan 
interest, taxpayers must negotiate elaborate phase-
out rules that vary from provision to provision. Such 
phase-outs effectively create high (but “invisible”) 
marginal tax rates, because each additional dollar of 
income reduces the credit, deduction, or exemption; 
these high marginal rates can significantly distort work 
effort and other behavior. Although in some cases 
(such as the EITC) the budgetary costs of removing 
such phase-outs may be prohibitive, we believe that, in 
general, it is preferable to pursue progressivity in the 
income tax by broadly adjusting rates, exemptions,  
and the standard deduction rather than by “means 
testing” numerous preferences narrowly targeted on 
specific groups. 
The Tax System is Burdensome to 
Taxpayers and the Government
To comply with and administer this complex system, 
Americans and their government spend the equivalent 
of $75 billion to $130 billion each year in terms of 
time and money—roughly 10 percent of individual 
and corporate income tax collections.42 This estimate 
does not include the increasing resources devoted to 
tax planning, creating employment for armies of tax 
accountants and lawyers, as loopholes and tax shelters 
have proliferated. Nor does it include the remaining 
costs of uncertainty, which even expensive planning 
cannot eliminate. While some complexity is inevitable 
in a large and diverse economy, such complexity wastes 
substantial economic resources, yields widespread 
frustration, and produces a sense of inequity. Eighty 
percent of Americans apparently believe that tax cuts 
are generally “aimed at helping …someone else.”43
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Yet, in spite of this expenditure of time and money, the 
system has not been effectively enforced because the 
Internal Revenue Service has been starved of resources. 
The “tax gap” between taxes paid and taxes owed has 
been estimated by the IRS at about $312 billion to 
$353 billion (for 2001), or about $2,000 per taxpayer 
return. The largest component of the gap was the 
underreporting of income, of which the underreporting 
of business activities on individual returns accounted 
for by far the largest revenue shortfall, $150 billion to 
$187 billion. (Underreporting of income appears to be 
about 15-19 percent of individual income tax revenues 
and roughly 20 percent of corporate revenues.)44 Over 
the period 1992-2004, the IRS permanent staff fell 
by 27 percent. Not surprisingly, during this period 
the overall audit rate on individual returns dropped 
by 27 percent, and the rate of non-correspondence 
audits plunged by 77 percent for individuals and 78 
percent for corporations.45 There is now evidence that 
the declines in IRS enforcement efforts have reduced 
taxpayers’ incentives to comply voluntarily with the 
tax laws: the IRS Oversight Board found in a recent 
survey that “one in five taxpayers now believes that 
it’s acceptable to cheat on their taxes,” and expresses 
concern that this trend will “place the entire tax 
administration system in peril.”46
In an inadequate enforcement environment, some 
corporations apparently grew increasingly aggressive 
in their efforts to reduce or escape tax liability, and the 
GAO has found that 63 percent of U.S. corporations 
paid no federal taxes from 1996 to 2000.47 The 1990s 
featured an increasing divergence between corporate 
book and tax income; in 1998 alone, book earnings	
exceeded taxable income by $287 billion for companies 
with assets in excess of $250 million.48 While book and 
tax income can be expected to differ, recent research 
suggests that much of the growth in this gap was due 
to increasingly aggressive tax avoidance.49 In the last 
several years, after the systematic marketing of tax 
shelters became prominent, both the IRS and Congress 
have become increasingly concerned with abusive tax 
shelters. The enforcement environment therefore may 
be improving. However, inadequate resources make it 
difficult for the IRS to provide both effective taxpayer 
service and adequate enforcement. 
Tax avoidance by corporations and individuals is 
legitimate, but the intensity with which it is pursued 
and the amount of resources wastefully expended 
are unquestionably related to the extraordinary 
complexity of the income tax, produced in great part 
by the accretion of special preferences, many narrowly 
targeted.
The Income Tax Alone Cannot Raise 
Sufficient Revenues
Faced with a large and growing fiscal gap, and the need 
for more revenues, the United States faces a difficult 
dilemma. In theory, of course, future income tax rates 
could be raised to help reduce the fiscal gap. But, as 
just noted, the current income tax system is complex, 
inefficient, and inequitable. Raising the tax rates of 
this dysfunctional system would compound existing 
distortions and disincentives, damaging the economy’s 
efficiency and capacity for growth. Higher income 
tax rates are becoming even more problematic as 
globalization intensifies; highly mobile capital becomes 
more likely to move offshore, shifting more of the tax 
burden to labor income, and the income tax becomes 
more difficult to administer and enforce. Ultimately it 
will become politically infeasible to continually raise 
income tax rates to cover ever-rising expenditures.
To avoid rate increases, and to promote simplicity, 
efficiency, and equity, tax reformers throughout the 
decades have favored the approach adopted in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986—“lower the rates and broaden 
the base.” By reducing preferences in the tax code, 
more income can be brought into the tax base. As 
just noted, base-broadening would make the system 
simpler, fairer, and more efficient. Base-broadening 
has great merit. CED strongly supports it and makes 
recommendations below to implement it. Indeed, were 
we starting from scratch in devising a tax system, we 
would favor a system with a very broad base of income 
or consumption that included few tax preferences 
and achieved progressivity by broad adjustments in 
individual exemptions, the standard deduction, and the 
rate structure. 
However, we are not starting from scratch. In the real 
world, there are severe practical limits to eliminating 
preferences and broadening the tax base—and therefore 
to raising revenues by this means. Previous tax reform 
efforts have explicitly been “revenue-neutral”—a luxury 
we can no longer afford. It is striking that even the 
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1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), widely regarded as a 
dramatic achievement in base broadening, increased 
income tax revenues by only about one-half percent of 
GDP by this means.50
Many major preferences in the tax code are today 
so embedded in our economic and social life and so 
deeply rooted politically that their elimination or great 
reduction is probably politically infeasible and in some 
cases unwise. Four sets of these preferences  
stand out:
• Tax privileged accounts for saving and 
retirement such as defined benefit pensions, 
401(k) plans, and IRAs now form the 
foundation for private retirement saving.
• The exclusion from taxable income of employer 
contributions to employee health insurance 
similarly forms the basis of our private health 
insurance system. 
• The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has 
become the major pillar of low-income support. 
• Removing entirely the deductibility of the 
interest paid on home mortgages would 
undermine the value of the homes that are the 
major asset of many families, who may have 
received little or no actual benefit from the tax 
preference.a 51 
The “tax expenditures” attributed to these four sets 
of preferences now total approximately $326 billion 
annually, about 36 percent of individual income tax 
revenue and 2.7 percent of GDP.52 We do not argue 
that these preferences are sacrosanct and should be 
held harmless in the process of tax reform. Indeed, we 
believe that modifications, if appropriately phased-in, 
would be beneficial, and we make recommendations 
to this effect below. However, we do not realistically 
expect base-broadening in these areas to be a source of 
greatly increased revenues.
The second major obstacle to raising significant 
revenues by simplifying the tax code is the budgetary 
effect of AMT repeal or reform. As noted in the 
discussion of the AMT above, 31 percent of individual 
taxpayers will pay the AMT in 2010 if no action is 
taken, so legislative action appears certain. Repeal of 
the AMT, however, would reduce revenues by over  
$1 trillion over 2005-2014 if the 2001-2003 tax cuts 
were extended, and by over $700 billion even if they 
were not. Substantial modifications of the AMT to 
reduce its impact on middle-class taxpayers would 
reduce revenues by about two-thirds of these amounts 
or more.53 As a result, any feasible base-broadening and 
tax simplification program that addresses the AMT 
may reduce rather than raise income tax revenues.  
For example, the 2014 revenue loss from AMT repeal 
today would be about $167 billion, or about  
0.9 percent of projected GDP—significantly larger 
than the net revenues of 0.5 percent of GDP produced 
by base-broadening in 1986. We conclude from this 
harsh but realistic arithmetic that a new revenue source 
will be necessary in the future if we are to avoid exploding 
deficits or unacceptably large increases in income tax rates.
a  Housing preferences generally are capitalized into housing prices 
so that a new owner in effect “prepays” the value of the tax  
preferences when purchasing the house.
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How might this be done? Our preferred policy would 
be to enact as soon as feasible, but realistically within 
the next several years, the new tax framework proposed 
below. These policies would more than meet these near-
term revenue requirements and—more important—
put fiscal policy on a sound and sustainable basis for 
the difficult years ahead. 
Some have suggested that we address the fiscal shortfall 
by allowing some, or all, of the 2001-2004 tax cuts 
to expire, as scheduled under current law. We do not 
believe this is a satisfactory policy option, for several 
reasons. First, the roll-back of the complete set of tax 
cuts would have virtually no political support, since 
many of these provisions are so-called “middle-class” 
tax cuts, such as the child tax credit, marriage penalty 
relief, the 10 percent tax bracket, and the liberalization 
of pension plans, such as 401(k)s, and the “529” college 
saving plans. Second, even if the most politically 
contentious of the provisions—the high-income 
marginal rate, capital gains, and dividend income 
reductions—were allowed to sunset, the additional 
revenues raised would amount to less than ½ percent 
of GDP.54 Whatever one’s view of the distributional 
implications, this would have very little impact on the 
long-term fiscal gap. Finally, as we argue below, we 
believe that the new framework we propose would be 
more conducive to economic efficiency and growth than 
the alternative of overall higher income tax rates.
Rather than court political deadlock by reviving 
the 2001-2003 tax battles, it would be preferable to 
make a quantum shift towards the new framework 
outlined below. In the process, we must reexamine 
and adjust the entire structure of tax rates, standard 
deductions, and low-income credits to produce a fair 
and progressive system.
In the near term, as we move towards a new tax 
framework, we must halt (and reverse if possible) the 
deterioration in our current fiscal position to prepare 
for the more severe challenges that lie ahead. In our 
March 2003 policy statement we said that
… after reviewing the size of our long-
term fiscal imbalance and the broad 
possibilities for spending reductions 
in Social Security, Medicare, national 
defense, homeland security, and other 
domestic programs, CED believes it 
extremely unlikely that the long-term 
budget problem can be solved without 
additional revenues. We therefore urge the 
Administration and Congress to forego 
at this time any additional tax reductions 
(including the permanent extension of 
EGTRRA) that would further reduce 
long-term revenues. Moreover, we 
should use this opportunity to begin to 
explore alternative or additional long-
term sources of revenue and taxation 
systems that support our long-term 
growth objectives.
In spite of a strengthening of revenue collections 
in early 2005, the long-term fiscal outlook is now 
significantly worse than it was in 2003, and we strongly 
reaffirm this recommendation. In practice, this means 
that any	tax	changes	in	the	next	several	years	should	
be	at	least	revenue-neutral;	if	the	2001-2004	tax	
cuts	are	to	be	extended,	the	revenue	losses	should	be	
financed	by	equivalent	(or	larger)	revenue	increases.	
This would be mandated if the PAYGO budget control 
rules were reinstated, as recommended below. 
IV. A New Framework:  
    CED’s Recommendations
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A new tax framework should be simpler and more 
transparent, more efficient, more equitable, less 
burdensome, and able to raise sufficient revenues. CED 
makes the following recommendations to promote 
these goals. These recommendations are far-reaching; 
their legislation and implementation will have to be 
phased in over several years, although (for the reasons 
noted above) we must begin work on them now. We 
emphasize again that such tax-related policy changes 
must be part of a “war on all fronts” of the federal 
budget, since large spending reductions, involving 
major reforms in major health and pension programs, 
will be required for long-term fiscal viability.
Summary of Recommendations
1. Eliminate	and	Reduce	Tax	Preferences,	Simplify	
the	Tax	System,	and	Broaden	the	Tax	Base.	
We should remove unnecessary complexities and 
reduce or eliminate tax preferences that do not 
have a compelling rationale. Remaining preferences 
should be consolidated and simplified, and in some 
cases deductions should be converted into credits. 
Consolidation of low-income and education 
credits and the reform of saving preferences offer 
important opportunities for simplification.
2. Phase	In	a	Broad-Based	10	Percent	Value-Added	
Tax	(VAT)	to	Supplement	the	Income	Tax. A 
VAT would provide additional revenues to help 
meet the impending fiscal crisis and to allow lower 
income tax rates (and associated distortions) 
than would otherwise be required. The VAT base 
should be as broad as possible, to enhance both 
economic neutrality and revenues. The VAT’s 
distributional effects should be addressed by 
modifications to the income tax, not by exclusions 
of particular goods and services, or exemptions of 
particular firms, from the VAT.
3. Modify	the	Income	Tax	to	Protect	Low-Income	
Households	from	the	Regressive	Effects	of	
the	VAT.	A common objection to a VAT is that 
it is regressive. However, the income tax can be 
modified to address this problem by restructuring 
and expanding a consolidated refundable low-
income tax credit, modifying rates for those with 
tax liability, and increasing the standard deduction 
to raise the tax-entry threshold.
4. Repeal	the	Individual	and	Corporate	Alternative	
Minimum	Taxes.	With AMT repeal, those 
targeted provisions of the AMT that discourage 
aggressive tax shelters should be incorporated 
into the regular income tax. We do not need two 
parallel tax systems to reduce tax preferences and 
promote equity. However, the introduction of a 
VAT and repeal of the AMT must be accompanied 
by changes in the income tax rate structure, standard 
deductions, and low-income credits to support the 
progressivity of the overall tax system.
5. Rationalize	Capital	Income	Taxation	by	
Integrating	the	Individual	and	Corporate	Income	
Taxes,	Narrowing	the	Differential	Treatment	
of	Ordinary	Income	and	Capital	Gains,	and	
Modifying	the	Estate	and	Gift	Taxes. We 
should tax capital income once, but only once, at 
rates that approximate those on other forms of 
income. The differential between the top rate on 
ordinary income and that on capital gains should 
be narrowed to reduce incentives for arbitrage and 
tax shelters. The estate tax should be retained. One 
option would be to continue in 2010 and thereafter 
the scheduled 2009 exemption of $3.5 million ($7 
million for couples) and top rate of 45 percent, with 
the exemption indexed for inflation.
6. Improve	the	Processes	for	Making	Tax	and	
Budget	Policies. Process changes are essential to 
help protect a new tax framework against renewed 
onslaughts in complexity and revenue erosion. In 
addition, rules for budget control should be restored 
and new requirements should be established for 
Congressional consideration of the long-term effects 
of fiscal policy.
7. Provide	the	Internal	Revenue	Service	with	the	
Political	Support	and	Resources	Required	to	
Support	the	Integrity	and	Revenue-Raising	
Capacity	of	the	Tax	System.
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Recommendation One: Eliminate  
And Reduce Tax Preferences,  
Simplify The Tax System,  
And Broaden The Tax Base. 
We are asking too much of the income tax system. 
The vast array of tax expenditures in the income tax 
code produces complexity, economic inefficiency, and 
inequity. We recognize that some of these preferences 
—and especially the larger ones directed at saving, 
health care, low-income support, and housing—are so 
embedded in our economic life that their elimination is 
infeasible and (in some cases) unwise. But among the 
146 tax expenditures are many that have no compelling 
economic or social rationale. We	should	eliminate	
or	reduce	these	preferences	to	the	greatest	extent	
possible.	This	will	reduce	inefficient	price	distortions	
and	inequities	and	permit	lower	income	tax	rates	
than	would	otherwise	be	necessary. 	
We	should	also	simplify,	consolidate,	and	improve	
the	preferences	that	remain. Tax provisions intended 
to promote equity or other social goals through 
narrow targeting, complex rules, and income-based 
phase-outs should in many cases be replaced by more 
broadly targeted provisions or by direct expenditures in 
situations where administrative and compliance costs 
are lower. In some cases “upside-down” tax subsidies 
designed as exclusions or deductions from income, 
which produce inefficient and inequitable incentives, 
should be converted into tax credits. 
This policy statement does not try to rewrite the tax 
code, and we have not undertaken a systematic and 
comprehensive review of all tax expenditures. However, 
some pertinent examples of the reforms we have in 
mind are:
•	 Production	tax	subsidies	that	favor	certain	
economic	sectors	or	activities	(such	as	energy,	
minerals	extraction,	timber,	agriculture,	
housing,	and,	most	recently,	"domestic	
production	activities")	at	the	expense	of	
others	should	be	eliminated	or	reduced. In 
cases where the subsidies cannot be eliminated, 
there may be opportunities to at least realign 
them with their original purposes. For example, 
the deduction for interest on home equity loans 
effectively subsidizes personal consumption 
expenditures rather than homeownership and 
encourages tax arbitrage through subsidized 
borrowing; it should be repealed, as recently 
suggested by the staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation ( JCT).55 The $1 million limit on 
mortgages qualifying for mortgage interest 
deductibility should be gradually reduced, and 
the deductibility of interest on mortgages for 
second homes should be phased out. CED	
reaffirms	these	three	recommendations	for	
changes	to	mortgage	interest	deductibility	
and	home	equity	loans	that	it	made	in	1991.56 
•	 Saving	incentives	should	be	consolidated;	
the	current	disarray	of	saving	incentives	
could	be	replaced	with	one	or	two	vehicles	
featuring	simpler	rules	governing	eligibility,	
contributions,	and	withdrawals.57 We believe 
that saving incentives should be aligned with 
retirement needs and should not be principally 
a device for shielding the capital income of the 
affluent from tax. 58 We	therefore	recommend	
that	the	exclusion	of	pension	contributions	
from	individual	tax	be	converted	to	a	
refundable	fixed-rate	credit.	This would  
make saving incentives both more effective and 
more equitable.59 
•	 The	current	bewildering	and	confusing		
tax	benefits	for	low-income	families	
and	children	should	be	simplified	by	
standardizing	definitions	of	income	and	
eligibility	and	consolidating	these	benefits. 
Currently, the EITC, child credit, child 
and dependent care tax credit, dependent 
exemption, and head of household rate 
schedule provide a complex matrix of choices. 
This complexity especially burdens low-income 
households with heavy compliance costs. Some 
or all of these could be consolidated into a 
single refundable and indexed credit. This 
would preserve or expand benefits for children 
and low-income families in a much simpler and 
more transparent structure that would reduce 
error rates and compliance costs.60
•	 An	indexed	cap	should	be	placed	on	the	
open-ended	tax	exclusion	of	employer	
contributions	to	purchase	health	insurance,	
as we recommended in 2002. This would 
promote both cost-conscious decisions in 
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purchasing insurance and equity, since the 
open-ended exclusion encourages high-cost 
insurance and disproportionately benefits 
higher-income employees. Capping the 
contribution at the average premium currently 
paid by employers would raise revenues 
currently by about $25 billion, or 0.2 percent  
of GDP.61
•	 Tax	subsidies	for	higher	education	should	
be	substantially	redirected	into	an	expanded	
Pell	Grant	expenditure	program	that	
provides	larger	grants	to	more	low-income	
students. Although we strongly believe in 
public support for education, those resources 
will be more effective if redirected in this way. 
If the tax credits are retained, they should be 
consolidated and simplified. The JCT staff 
has recently suggested combining the Hope 
Tax Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit, and 
the deduction for higher learning expenses 
into a single per-student credit that would be 
simpler and more equitable than the current 
preferences.62
• The National Taxpayer Advocate and the JCT 
staff have made numerous other proposals 
for tax simplification. We	urge	Congress	to	
consider	these	proposals	expeditiously.63
A major effort to eliminate, reduce, and simplify tax 
preferences would make the tax code more efficient, 
more equitable, and more acceptable to many now 
frustrated by its complexity. However, as explained 
above, even a successful base broadening program will 
not raise significant revenue when combined with the 
repeal of the AMT.
Recommendation Two: Phase In  
A Broad-Based 10 Percent  
Value-Added Tax (VAT) To Supplement 
The Income Tax
As stated in the beginning of this report, the 
impending fiscal crisis will require either a new revenue 
source or much higher income tax rates, even in the 
context of large spending reductions. CED strongly 
prefers the former and recommends	phasing	in	a	
value-added	tax	to	supplement	the	income	tax.64 
Over 100 nations, and 29 of 30 OECD members, 
now have VATs, many adopted within the last several 
decades as experience and practice have grown. The 
United States is now the only major industrialized 
country that does not employ such a tax.65 Although 
discussions of tax reform have largely focused on 
substituting a consumption tax for the income tax, we 
believe that a VAT will best serve to supplement and 
complement an income tax, as it does in most other 
countries. A VAT is needed to raise revenues in a 
neutral manner that does not discriminate among 
economic sectors or penalize saving, while an income 
tax is required to preserve the progressivity of the  
tax system.66 
A VAT is a tax on the value of goods and services 
that is added at each stage of the production process. 
There are several ways of designing a VAT. Under the 
subtraction method, used in Japan, each firm computes 
its value added (by subtracting purchases from sales) 
and pays tax on it. The more widely used invoice-credit 
VAT (See Box: How a VAT Works) requires each 
business firm to collect tax on its sales at the specified 
rate and pass to the purchaser an invoice as proof of the 
tax liability. The purchaser, in turn, is able to credit tax 
on these purchases against the tax charged on his sales. 
He pays tax on the difference and receives a refund if 
there are excess credits. Because investment goods are 
treated like any other purchased input, the VAT is in 
effect a tax on consumption. In principle, the economic 
effect of a VAT is the same as that of a well-designed 
retail sales tax. However, compliance is better than 
under a retail sales tax because smaller amounts of  
tax are distributed more widely among firms, and  
the invoice-credit procedure allows cross-checking  
of invoices.67
Some countries’ VATs have exempted certain products, 
or sectors of the economy, either because their value 
added is hard to tax (e.g. financial services and small 
businesses) or to protect low-income households from 
the tax. Preferential tax rates for food, health care, 
education, and other products have often been used for 
the latter purpose. Exemptions and preferential rates, 
however, greatly increase administrative costs, increase 
inefficient distortions, and generally provide relatively 
small distributional benefits.68 We recognize that 
some exemption for small business will be necessary 
for practical reasons and that policy or political 
considerations may require other adjustments. But 
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one of the chief attractions of the VAT is its economic 
neutrality among different economic goods, services, 
and sectors, and this neutrality is compromised by 
exemptions and preferential rates. Therefore,	we	
strongly	urge	that	a	VAT	be	implemented	at	a	single	
rate	on	as	broad	a	base	as	possible.
We believe that a tax system combining a VAT with 
a simpler income tax is the best tax system we can 
realistically pursue. This combination would be more 
conducive to economic efficiency and growth than the 
alternative of higher income tax rates. First, a broad-
based VAT would be largely neutral with respect 
to different economic activities and sectors and, by 
effectively expensing investment, avoid the large 
distortions in investment behavior produced by the 
current income tax. Second, the shift of some taxes 
from income to consumption	should increase domestic 
saving and investment, in part by discouraging the 
export of capital that would result from higher income 
tax rates. Third, as noted above, this “diversified” tax 
regime should produce a smaller economic burden 
from tax distortions than would higher income tax 
rates alone. We are concerned about the economic 
distortions and burdens that will result as income 
tax rates rise, and we believe there will be enormous 
political resistance to continual increases in income 
tax rates as the fiscal crisis unfolds. A VAT should be 
phased in as soon as possible to forestall rising deficits 
and debt burdens, increase the flexibility of our revenue 
system, and provide us with more fiscal options for  
the future.
Many features of a VAT would have to be addressed 
in its design and implementation, as they have been 
in other countries. Certain sectors, such as financial 
services and residential housing, are difficult to tax 
under a VAT, and may require special treatment. The 
treatment of government activities and non-profits also 
raises unique issues. In our federal system, a federal 
VAT raises especially difficult problems with regard 
to state retail sales taxes (RSTs), since the tax bases 
of RSTs would differ from one another and from that 
Under the invoice-credit system of administering a VAT, the “value added” at each stage of production is taxed by allowing producers 
to offset the tax owed on their sales with credits for taxes paid by their suppliers at earlier stages of production.  In this example of a 
10% VAT, the manufacturer pays $40 in VAT on $400 of sales.  When the wholesaler purchases the goods from the manufacturer, he 
receives an invoice for the $40 of VAT tax that has been paid and takes this as a credit against the $70 VAT that he owes on his $700 
of sales; he then pays $30, the difference between the tax charged on his sales and the taxes already paid on his purchases.  Similarly, 
the retailer receives an invoice for $70 from the wholesaler and uses it as a credit against the $100 of VAT that he will owe on $1000 
of sales, thereby paying net VAT of $30.  In effect, the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer each pay a 10% tax on the actual value 
added at their stage of production.  
In total, the $100 VAT paid by stages is equivalent to a retail sales tax of 10% on final sales at the retail level.  However, the invoice-
credit system creates strong incentives for compliance because each firm will ensure that it receives the invoices required for its credits 
and that its intermediate purchases are not undervalued.  This creates a record of sales, invoices and credits throughout the stages of 
production that assists effective enforcement.
Here is the table from CBO study, p. 7  TABLE 1   I'VE LEFT OUT RETAILS SALES PART, WHICH WILL BE C
HOW A VAT WORKS
10% Invoice-Credit VAT Example
Manufacturer Wholesaler Retailer Total Tax
1 Sales 400 700 1000
2 Purchases 0 400 700
3 Actual Value Added (1-2) 400 300 300
4 Tax on Sales 40 70 100
5 Credit on Purchases 0 40 70
6 VAT Owed (4-5) 40 30 30 100
Please do the following:
1..This is for 5% VAT; convert to 10%
2.  Figure out how to modify the table so that it also shows the actual value added at each stage and for total
3.  In your text, explain how this is equivalent to a retail sales tax.
Stage of Production
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of the VAT.a This would create substantial pressures 
for the states to convert their RSTs to VATs, or at 
least adopt the VAT tax base, which some would 
regard as an assault upon state fiscal autonomy and 
others an opportunity to reform RSTs that are often 
economically inefficient and needlessly complex.69 
This policy statement is not the place to address these 
detailed issues, which will require careful consideration. 
But other countries have found ways of dealing with 
these special problems; these include federalist  
Canada, where the federal VAT coexists with RSTs in 
the provinces.70
A VAT would require significant additional 
administration and compliance costs. The 
administrative costs might run about $1 billion to  
$2 billion annually, and the compliance costs $5 billion 
to $8 billion.71 (Compliance costs for the income 
tax, however, could be reduced by the simplification 
measures we propose.) Because of these costs, it would 
not be worthwhile to levy a VAT at a low rate. We 
suggest a broad-based VAT of 10 percent, phased in 
over several years, which would raise roughly 4 percent 
of GDP annually (about $490 billion at 2005 income 
levels).72 In the longer term, the VAT would provide 
a large degree of fiscal flexibility; simple adjustments 
of the VAT rate could be used to meet larger revenue 
requirements or to finance further changes in the 
income tax or payroll taxes.
Recommendation Three: Modify  
The Income Tax To Protect  
Low-Income Households From the 
Regressive Effects Of The VAT. 
A common objection to a VAT is that it is regressive: 
households with lower incomes consume a larger 
proportion of their income than more affluent 
households and therefore pay a larger proportion of 
annual income in tax. There are several responses 
to this objection. First, relating consumption tax 
burdens to annual income overstates regressivity; a 
VAT is much less regressive in relation to lifetime 
consumption.73 Second, considerable protection is 
provided to the elderly and disabled by the indexation 
of Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, 
and other benefits and payments. Finally, and most 
important, the income tax can be modified to offset the 
regressive effects of a VAT to the degree desired. Three 
instruments are available for this purpose: income 
tax rates can be reduced for those with tax liability; 
the standard deduction can be increased to raise the 
tax-entry threshold; and refundable tax credits can be 
used to assist those with little or no tax liability. We 
have proposed above that the EITC, child credit, and 
possibly other provisions supporting children and low-
income families be consolidated into a single refundable 
tax credit. This unified credit could be expanded and 
structured to redress the impact of the VAT on low-
income households. Since there are approximately as 
many low-income childless households as those with 
children, the credit should provide relief to households 
both with and without children.74 A low-income credit 
simulated by CBO was shown to fully offset the VAT 
(on average) for households in the lowest quintile of 
the income distribution.75
There is another critical, but seldom discussed, 
point regarding the impact of a VAT on low-income 
households—the importance of the revenue-raising 
capacity of the VAT for preserving low-income support 
programs. Under current budget policies, the growth 
of budget deficits and largely middle-class entitlements 
will create enormous political pressures to reduce or 
eliminate such programs. As David Stockman famously 
noted, the burden of fiscal retrenchment, for well-
understood political reasons, falls on weak clients, not 
weak claims.76 The effects of a VAT on equity should 
be considered on both the tax and spending sides of  
the budget.
Recommendation Four: Repeal  
the Individual and Corporate 
Alternative Minimum Taxes
As noted above, the AMT (both individual and 
corporate) has become one of the most problematic 
features of the income tax. Originally intended to 
reduce tax avoidance by a small number of high-
a  This problem would be mitigated by a subtraction-type VAT, 
for which the accounting framework and required data would be 
similar to those of an income tax.
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income individuals and corporations, its creeping 
encroachment on millions of middle-class taxpayers 
has been deferred only by a series of one-year “fixes” 
in recent years. It is widely recognized that a more 
permanent solution will have to be enacted very soon.
Official estimates of future income tax revenues have 
been grossly overstated because they assume that the 
AMT “stealth tax” on middle-income taxpayers will 
remain in place. Clearly, this will not happen. But how 
should the problem be addressed?
CED	believes	that	the	AMT	should	be	repealed.	
This	should	be	accompanied	by	income	tax	changes	
that	preserve	progressivity	and	incorporate	into	
the	regular	income	tax	those	provisions	of	the	
AMT	that	discourage	aggressive	tax	shelters. 	In 
short, we should not continue to use the complex and 
bewildering AMT to redress the real or perceived 
deficiencies of the income tax. If, for whatever reason, 
we decide that certain tax preferences should be 
retained in the income tax, we should address the 
consequences of those preferences transparently 
and directly in the income tax itself, not by the 
deceptive sleight-of-hand of an AMT. Any undesired 
distributional consequences of AMT repeal should be 
addressed through adjustments in income tax rates.
We recognize that repeal of the individual AMT 
involves a very large future revenue loss—over a trillion 
dollars during 2005-2014 if the 2001-2003 tax cuts 
are extended after 2010, and about $700 billion even if 
they “sunset.” This clearly implies that AMT repeal will 
require either a new revenue source (as proposed in this 
statement) or significantly higher income tax rates. For 
the reasons indicated above, we prefer a new revenue 
source. If AMT repeal nevertheless proves infeasible, 
the AMT should at least be modified by changes that 
redirect it towards its original purpose of curbing 
tax shelter abuse and prevent it from burdening 
ordinary taxpayers. Although this approach would cost 
somewhat less in terms of forgone revenues, we regard 
it as a distinctly inferior alternative to repeal. 77
Recommendation Five: Rationalize 
Capital Income Taxation by Integrating 
the Individual and Corporate Income 
Taxes, Narrowing the Differential 
Treatment of Ordinary Income and 
Capital Gains, and Modifying the 
Estate and Gift Taxes. 
The taxation of capital income may be the most 
problematic area of tax policy. Under current law, 
both stock dividends and capital gains are taxed at 
preferential low rates, and capital gains receive tax 
deferral and are untaxed at death due to the step-up 
of basis. Preferential treatment of capital income is 
presumably intended to increase saving and capital 
formation, but there is little evidence that it has 
performed this function.78 Such preferences are also 
seen as improving horizontal equity, by compensating 
in some degree for the taxation of saving. In addition, 
preferential capital gains tax rates are often defended 
as a crude offset to the taxation of the inflationary 
component of capital gains, although other capital 
gains preferences (i.e. tax deferral and step-up in basis 
at death) may more than compensate for this. In any 
case, the web of capital gains preferences has become 
bewilderingly complex.
The differing tax treatment of dividends and interest 
influences the form of organization that businesses 
adopt and the type of financing they employ.79 In 
addition, taxing long-term capital gains at rates far 
below the top rate on ordinary income—the scheduled 
rates under current law are 15 percent versus  
35 percent—invites tax avoidance and evasion. Tax 
shelters are commonly constructed by characterizing 
ordinary income as capital gains in order to secure 
the more advantageous rate, which reduces revenues 
and wastes resources in both avoidance activities and 
attempts to enforce compliance.
We believe that capital income should be taxed once, 
and only once. Capital income is now taxed through 
the corporate income tax, but dividends distributed to 

shareholders are taxed again as personal income. (The 
15 percent preferential tax rate provided for dividends 
in the 2003 legislation provided a simple but crude 
response to this problem.) Undistributed corporate 
income may also be double-taxed when it reappears as 
capital gains. To remedy this, we	believe	the	individual	
and	corporate	income	taxes	should	be	integrated.	 
Integration could produce significant gains in economic 
efficiency and horizontal equity.80 There are several 
possible approaches to integration, and we do not  
make a specific recommendation here. However, we 
urge the administration and Congress to consider alter-
natives for integration as they proceed with tax reform. 
(See Box: Integrating the Individual and Corporate 
Income Taxes.)
CED	also	believes	that	the	taxation	of	capital	gains	
should	be	simplified	and	the	prospective	20	percent-
age	point	differential	between	the	tax	rates	on	capital	
gains	and	ordinary	(top-bracket)	income	should	
be	substantially	reduced.	While the arguments for 
and against preferential treatment for capital gains are 
complex, it is evident that the current system is unnec-
essarily complicated and that such a large preferential 
margin simply invites tax shelters and other wasteful 
tax avoidance activities. One simple way to address 
both these problems would be to replace the multiple 
rates on different types of long-term gains with a 
deduction from taxable income of a fixed percentage of 
the gains.81 This would allow a very simple computa-
tion similar to the percentage exclusion that was used 
during 1942-1985. The	percentage	deduction	should	
INTEGRATING THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
There are four main approaches to integration:
1.  Shareholder Allocation or “Full Integration,”
2.  Shareholder Credits for Corporate Taxes Paid,
3.  Corporate Deductions for Dividends Paid, and
4.  Shareholder Exclusions for Dividends Received.
(1)  Under Shareholder Allocation, all corporate earnings, whether distributed or not, are attributed to share-
holders and taxed as individual income, as if the corporation were a partnership.  Shareholder allocation is 
somewhat impractical, and not often seriously considered, because it would require that unrealized income  
be taxed.  
(2)  The Shareholder Credit  provides that shareholders receive a credit for corporate taxes already paid on 
the dividends that the shareholder receives.  The dividend income would then be taxed at the shareholder’s 
income tax rate, and a credit for corporate tax paid would then be subtracted to determine the tax liability.  
(3)  The Corporate Deduction approach would have the corporation deduct dividends paid to sharehold-
ers just as it now deducts interest.  The corporation tax would remain as a separate entity, and shareholders 
would pay tax at the individual rate.  
(4)  Under Shareholder Exclusion, dividends are taxed only at the corporate level and not to shareholders.   
A comprehensive example of this approach is the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) that was 
proposed by the Treasury Department under the George H.W. Bush Administration.*  Neither dividends 
nor interest payments would be excluded from taxable corporate income.  Instead, both dividends and  
interest would be paid from post-tax corporate profits and distributed to shareholders on a tax-free basis.  
Source: Michael J. Graetz and Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction,  
September 27, 1999. 
* US Department of Treasury, Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once,  
January, 1992
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any law it passes. But improved procedures could make 
it politically more difficult to enact counterproductive 
changes by increasing public attention to tax provisions 
that benefit narrow interests and increase complexity, 
and by giving opponents of those provisions a process 
for actively opposing them. CED favors several such 
process reforms:
•	 Congress	should	restore	the	pay-as-you-go	
(PAYGO)	budget	control	rules	that	required	
that	legislated	tax	cuts	or	increases	in	entitle-
ment	spending	be	financed	by	equivalent	
spending	reductions	or	tax	increases.	
The PAYGO rules were enacted in the Budget Enforce-
ment Act of 1990 and later renewed before expiring in 
2002. Although the application of budget control rules 
during the 1990s was far from perfect, we believe that 
the PAYGO rules (as well as the caps on discretionary 
appropriations) were an important factor in reducing, 
and temporarily eliminating, the budget deficit and in 
focusing government policymakers on fiscal responsi-
bility. It was a mistake to allow these rules to expire and 
we strongly favor their restoration as soon as possible.
•	 Congress	should	change	the	rules	for	"budget	
reconciliation"	to	ensure	that	they	are		
used	for	deficit	reduction,	not	for	spending	
increases	and	tax	cuts.
At the beginning of the 1980s, Congress began to use 
“reconciliation bills” to expedite and protect legislation 
to reduce the deficit by reducing entitlement spending 
and raising revenues. The reconciliation process was in-
strumental in securing deficit-reduction legislation over 
nearly two decades. In recent years, however, reconcili-
ation bills have been used to expedite and protect tax 
cuts that increase current and future deficits. In light 
of the fiscal crisis ahead, the use of reconciliation to 
increase the deficit should be prohibited.
•	 Estimates	of	the	budgetary	cost	of	tax	leg-
islation	should	show	the	long-term	impact	
on	revenues	when	all	provisions	are	fully	
phased-in;	this	would	discourage	the	use		
of	misleading	estimates	that	assume	only		
"temporary"	revenue	effects.
As noted above, the use of “sunsets” has now become 
virtually standard practice in obscuring the true costs 
of tax legislation and allowing Congress to circumvent 
be	set	at	a	level	that	reduces	the	effective	preferen-
tial	margin	and	incentives	for	arbitrage	and	shelter	
activities,	for	instance	to	10	percentage	points	(i.e.,	
an	effective	tax	rate	of	25	percent	on	long-term	gains	
if	the	top	rate	remained	at	35	percent.) An alterna-
tive approach, if the top rate on ordinary income were 
reduced sufficiently, would be to tax long-term gains as 
ordinary income, as was done in the Tax Reform Act  
of 1986.
Estate and gift taxation is closely related to the issue 
of capital income. EGTRRA provided for gradual 
increases in the unified credit and thus in the effective 
exemption level from $600 thousand pre-EGTRRA to 
$1.5 million in 2005 and $3.5 million in 2009. Similar 
gradual reductions from 50 percent to 45 percent occur 
in the top rate of tax. The estate tax (but not the gift 
tax) is then repealed for 2010 before it reverts to its 
pre-EGTRRA structure in 2011. We recognize that 
smaller estates began to feel the burden of the tax as 
the real value of the (unindexed) unified credit declined 
prior to 2001, and that modifications were necessary. 
However, CED is strongly committed to the prin-
ciple of equality of opportunity and does not believe 
that principle is compatible with the repeal of the tax 
on large estates that transfer major accumulations of 
wealth. We	therefore	recommend	that	the	estate	tax	
be	retained.	One	straightforward	option	would	be	to	
retain	the	scheduled	2009	exemption	of	$3.5	million	
($7	million	for	couples)	and	top	rate	of	45	percent	in	
2010	and	thereafter,	while	indexing	the	exemption	
level	for	inflation.	
Recommendation Six: Improve  
the Processes for Making Tax and 
Budget Policies
Any tax reform will face formidable challenges by 
vested interests that organize to maintain the prefer-
ences found in the current system. The 1986 tax reform 
was gradually undermined by changes that have again 
left a Swiss-cheese tax system in disarray today. Both a 
simplified income tax and a value-added tax would be 
susceptible to such pressures in the future.
We are not so naïve as to believe that any set of budget-
ary or legislative procedures will completely and per-
manently fix this problem; Congress can later rescind 
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the intent of budgetary rules. In addition, these tempo-
rary tax measures frustrate fiscal planning by making 
official budget projections misleading. The recent his-
tory of both tax and prescription drug legislation makes 
it evident that much more awareness and understand-
ing of the long-term costs of fiscal actions are needed. 
However many years Congress chooses as the “window” 
for its budget decisions, it is essential that longer-term 
cost estimates be available when required for this pur-
pose. In this regard, as we said in 2003, it would be use-
ful to require statistical measures of fiscal balance (such 
as the “fiscal gap”) and an explanation of how proposed 
policies would affect those measures and future levels of 
taxes or public debt.82
•	 The	Joint	Committee	on	Taxation	should	
also	report	the	revenue-equivalent	change	in	
income	tax	rates	that	would	be	required	to	
finance	new	tax	expenditures.
We believe that policymakers and the public should 
be helped to recognize not only the budgetary implica-
tions but also the forgone opportunities implied by tax 
legislation. Thus, if new tax expenditures are proposed, 
there should be not only an accounting of the revenue 
loss involved, but also an analysis of how much tax rates 
might have been reduced (or might have to be raised in 
the future) to finance them. While the tax rate changes 
might be quite small for individual provisions of law, 
they could be significant in the aggregate, and their pre-
sentation would, in any case, make an important point.
•	 Congressional	rules	should	preclude	the		
consideration	of	tax	legislation	unless	it	is		
accompanied	by	a	report	by	the	Joint		
Committee	on	Taxation	that	estimates	its	
impact	on	complexity	and	on	reporting	and	
compliance	burdens.
In 1998, the Congress passed legislation requiring 
the JCT to prepare for each Congress a report on the 
overall state of the tax system, including simplification 
proposals. A comprehensive report was submitted in 
2001, but has been largely ignored by policymakers. 
This legislation also mandated that the JCT provide 
complexity analysis of tax bills as soon as possible after 
bills are filed. However, the legislative process has not 
provided time for such reporting. Our proposal would 
strengthen this complexity analysis by requiring it 
before consideration of the legislation. Congress, of 
course, can waive such a requirement, but such disre-
gard for increasing tax complexity should at least be a 
matter of public record.83
•	 The	Office	of	Management	and	Budget,	the	
Treasury	Department,	and	other	federal	
agencies	should	conduct	more	rigorous		
evaluations	of	tax	expenditures	and	their	
relationship	to	spending	programs.
As described above, tax expenditures, like ordinary 
spending programs, now are major instruments of  
government policy. The roughly $725 billion of tax  
expenditures is equivalent to about 30 percent of non-
interest spending for 2005. Many of these tax prefer-
ences appear to be unwarranted, for the reasons we 
have noted—yet little analysis has been done on their 
effects. And even preferences that might be warranted 
often overlap with ordinary spending programs. Yet tax 
and spending policies have historically moved on two 
separate tracks, with little coordination. In 2004, the 
Office of Management and Budget began to provide 
explicit directives to federal agencies to include tax 
expenditure information and analysis in their budget 
submissions, as called for by the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee report on the 1993 Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA). We applaud 
this initiative. Yet, the President’s 2006 budget shows 
little evidence of the incorporation of tax expenditure 
analysis into its policy decisions. Indeed, the budget 
states that, with regard to performance objectives, “the 
Executive Branch is continuing to focus on the avail-
ability of data needed to assess the effects of tax expen-
ditures designed to increase savings.” We believe that a 
much more comprehensive effort is required to evaluate 
the effects of tax expenditures, given their enormous 
budgetary cost at a time of impending fiscal crisis.84
Recommendation Seven: Provide  
the Internal Revenue Service With 
Political Support And Resources
The Internal Revenue Service has for many years been 
starved of resources, and in the late 1990s problems 
with customer service turned it into a political target. 
Its problems with the public led to a major effort 
to improve taxpayer service, but this commitment 
of resources, in the absence of significant funding 
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increases, meant that enforcement expenditures, IRS 
staff, audit rates, and tax prosecutions and penalties all 
significantly declined. The audit rate on taxpayers with 
reported incomes greater than $100,000 declined from 
5.3 percent in 1992 to 1.39 percent in 2004, at the 
same time that Congress mandated a disproportionate 
enforcement focus on low-income EITC recipients, 
which does not appear to be a cost-effective use of 
these scarce resources.85 Meanwhile, the IRS Oversight 
Board has observed that “the stark budget reality [is 
that the] IRS does not have the resources to close the 
$300 billion tax gap”, which comes to about $2,000 per 
taxpayer return.86 Although the administration’s budget 
requests have been almost fully funded, those requests 
typically have not been large enough to accommodate 
stronger enforcement, better taxpayer service, and 
mandated “unbudgeted expenses” such as government-
wide pay increases.87
We recognize that there have been some positive 
developments in enforcement recently, in particular 
the actions taken by the IRS to shut down abusive 
tax shelters and renewed Congressional interest in 
this issue.88 But this is only a small part of the larger 
compliance problem. It is apparent to us that the 
IRS does not have enough resources to produce both 
high quality taxpayer service and vigorous, effective 
enforcement, despite the best efforts of several IRS 
Commissioners to balance these objectives. We 
recognize that the IRS continues to face problems 
other than inadequate funding, in particular the 
modernization of its business systems. But the reports 
of the GAO and the IRS Oversight Board make it 
clear that funding is a fundamental barrier to effective 
enforcement. 
We believe there is a serious danger that taxpayers’ 
incentives to comply voluntarily with the tax laws will 
be compromised by weak enforcement and perceptions 
that the tax code is unfairly applied and enforced. We 
also believe that it is very short-sighted, in an era of 
increasing budget deficits, not to invest more resources 
in reducing the $300 billion tax gap. The IRS Oversight 
Board estimates that additional enforcement resources 
have approximately a 4 to 1 return, and that increasing 
the Administration’s FY2006 request for enforcement 
activities by $435 million would increase revenues by 
about $1.74 billion.89 
For these reasons, CED believes the administration 
and Congress should reaffirm their support for the 
IRS and its mission and restore IRS staff and funding 
to the levels required for effective administration and 
enforcement.
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V. Adding It Up: The Budget Impact of the  
    New Framework
The above recommendations for a new framework 
are for the most part broad and directional and do 
not attempt to provide a detailed tax program. Such a 
detailed set of policy changes could take many different 
forms, especially with regard to the reduction of tax 
preferences. Nevertheless, we can illustrate the effects 
of the new framework by making some simplifying 
assumptions about such policy changes, as detailed 
below. Figures 5 and 6 and Table 1 show the long-
term budgetary impact of such a simplified CED tax 
framework in the context of different assumptions 
about spending policies.
Spending Restraint Under  
Current Tax Policies
Figure 5 and Table 1-A outline the budget effects of a 
very substantial reduction in spending growth in the 
context of a continuation of current tax policies. The 
“historical spending” and “restrained spending” paths 
are those described in Section II above (adjusted to 
reflect the effects of current tax policy on interest costs). 
It should be recalled that the “restrained spending” 
path implies severe—perhaps unrealistic—reductions 
in Medicare and Medicaid spending as well as other 
spending reductions, compared with historical trends. 
Figure 5
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“Current tax policy” assumes that the 2001-2004 tax 
cuts and other expiring provisions (including estate 
tax repeal) will be extended and that the individual 
AMT will be curtailed enough to prevent a significant 
increase in the proportion of AMT taxpayers.
The notable result shown in Figure 5 and Table 1-A is 
that, under current tax policies, even this quite severe 
spending restraint does not come close to restoring fiscal 
balance or a sustainable fiscal policy, with debt growing no 
faster than GDP.` While deficits, of course, are smaller 
than under the “historical spending” scenario, they 
continue to grow steadily towards 5.8 percent of GDP 
in 2025 and nearly 10 percent by 2035. The debt/GDP 
ratio, reflecting the spiraling effect of higher interest 
costs, rises rapidly and exceeds 100 percent of GDP  
by 2035.
The CED Tax Framework With 
Spending Restraint
Figure 6 and Table I-B, in comparison, show the 
long-term budget effects of substituting the CED 
tax framework for current tax policy, with the same 
restrained spending policies assumed above. (The 
slower growth of “restrained spending” in Figure 6 
results entirely from the lower interest costs associated 
with the higher revenues and lower deficits.) 
The simplified CED tax framework used here assumes 
the “current tax policies” described above, modified by 
the following changes beginning in 2008:
• A phased-in VAT beginning at a 5 percent rate, 
rising to 10 percent in 2012;
• A refundable income tax credit providing VAT 
relief for low-income households (see page 32 
and footnote 74);
• Unspecified reductions in tax preferences that 
raise 0.5 percent of GDP in revenues;
• Repeal of the AMT;
• Integration of the individual and corporate 
income taxes with an individual dividend 
exclusion;
• Retention of the estate tax with an indexed 
$3.5 million exemption and 45 percent top rate, 
as provided in current law for 2009 (effective in 
2010); and
Figure 6
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Table 1
BUDGET EFFECTS OF TAX POLICY CHANGES WITH SPENDING RESTRAINT
Percentage of GDP
• Long-term capital gains taxed by deducting 
28.6 percent of the gains from taxable  
income (equivalent to a 25 percent top  
capital gains rate).
As shown in Figure 6 and Table 1-B, the effects of 
substituting the CED tax framework for current tax 
policy in the context of substantial spending restraint 
are striking. For a period of several decades, the deficit 
moves into surplus and the debt/GDP ratio falls 
towards zero, before deficits reappear under continuing 
pressures from health care costs.
Two caveats are important here. First, the assumed 
spending restraint is quite large, so that the projected 
budget surpluses during 2010-2033 may be optimistic. 

Whatever the degree of spending restraint, however, 
the budgetary impact of raising revenues in the near 
future would be dramatic. Second, the CED tax 
framework is no budget panacea; eventually deficits 
reappear and debt burdens begin to rise. As noted in 
Section II above, fundamental changes in expenditure 
programs, and in particular the entitlement programs 
on "automatic pilot," are not only necessary, but 
inevitable in the long term. 
Nevertheless, the vital lesson to be drawn from Figure 6 
and Table 1-B is that the additional revenues from the 
CED tax framework not only reduce deficits and debt 
directly, but, by forestalling an explosion in interest costs, 
allow us to “buy time” to restructure health care and 
other expenditure programs. Table 1-B shows these 
remarkable fiscal benefits of compound interest; the 
larger revenues reduce interest costs in 2025 by 3.2 
percent of GDP, nearly as large as the direct revenue 
impact of 3.7 percent, and by 2035 the interest effect is 
much larger.
In addition, the VAT, levied on a broad base, would 
allow necessary additions to revenue without the very 
large increases in income tax rates that would otherwise 
be necessary. It would require an increase in income 
tax rates of 35-40 percent to raise the net revenues of 
about 3.7 percent of GDP produced by the proposed 
CED tax framework, including the VAT levied on a 
very broad base.
We therefore believe there would be manifold benefits 
from CED’s new tax framework. A simpler and fairer 
income tax, maintaining relatively low marginal tax 
rates, would benefit taxpayers directly and improve 
economic efficiency and welfare. A supplementary VAT 
would raise the revenues required to increase national 
saving and help forestall a fiscal crisis that would curtail 
growth of the economy and living standards.
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The current public discussion of tax reform misses a 
central point—the inadequacy of the current system for 
raising the revenues the nation will need in the future. 
The primary purpose of any tax system must be to raise 
the revenues required to pay for government. Here the 
current system, and the current discussion, fail.
Reform is urgently needed. We have outlined broadly 
the direction that such reform should take—an  
improved income tax supplemented by a VAT. A 
simpler income tax with fewer preferences and complex 
provisions would be fairer to ordinary taxpayers and 
would enhance economic efficiency and growth. And a 
VAT would provide the additional revenues required 
to help address the impending fiscal crisis.
Taken together, CED’s recommendations involve far-
reaching changes in our tax system. However, unlike 
some “fundamental tax reforms” that involve scrapping 
the income tax entirely and thereby creating enormous 
problems in the transition to a new system, this “hy-
brid” system could be more easily implemented. The 
fundamental structure of the income tax would not 
change, and the journey to a VAT, which would admit-
tedly require many difficult choices, would take place 
on the well-prepared ground that over 100 other  
nations have covered in recent decades.
Changes of this magnitude clearly will have to be 
implemented in stages, and many design details will 
have to be considered at each stage. Such changes will 
encounter strong resistance, especially from those who 
oppose all and any tax increases and from those with 
strong vested interests in the current system. But the 
tax system and the long-term federal budget outlook 
continue to deteriorate, and soon the inadequacy of 
revenues will be impossible to ignore. We must seize 
the moment before the crisis arrives.
VI. Conclusion
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Memoranda of Comment, Reservation  
or Dissent
On progressivity and equity (pp. iv, 25)  
W. BOWMAN CUTTER, with which  
W.D. EBERLE and LINDA SMITH WILSON  
have asked to be associated .
I wish to emphasize that, while fully agreeing with 
the analysis and recommendations of this report, my 
personal long term and continuing support for this 
report or any subsequent effort actually to change the 
tax system in these directions depends upon a real 
commitment to maintaining a progressive tax structure 
and to protecting low income households.  In my 
personal view, tax policy during the last 5 years has 
moved in the wrong direction and has left a tax system 
that both raises inadequate revenues for the long term 
and has increased regressivity.  I am also fully aware 
of the genuine skepticism with which any suggestion 
of a VAT is greeted because a VAT, by itself, can be 
regressive.  However, I also believe strongly that the 
combination proposed here of the income tax and a 
supplemental VAT uniquely enables the nation to raise 
the revenues it requires and simultaneously to return 
progressivity to the tax system.
On AMT Repeal (pp iv, 32-33) and  
IRS Enforcement (pp v, 39-40),  
JOSH WESTON
AMT Repeal
The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) should 
not be entirely repealed.  Instead, a much simpler 
AMT should be retained as part of an improved tax 
system.  This is because any likely income tax system 
will inevitably be accompanied by preferences and 
“loopholes” that produce an “avoidance industry” that 
produces unfair outcomes, cynicism, and resentment.  
As the CED statement says, the current AMT is too 
complicated, affects too many taxpayers of modest 
income, and has too many loopholes of its own, to be 
efficient, fair and simple.
A New Tax Framework: How to Avert a Fiscal Crisis
I recommend a simple AMT with a higher exemption 
(perhaps $100,000 for joint filers) indexed for inflation 
that would apply to all income (including municipal 
bond interest and capital gains.)  This comprehensive 
income would be taxed at a low, flat rate of perhaps 10 
percent if the resulting tax exceeded regular income tax 
liability.  Such an AMT, with absolutely no deductions, 
would be very simple.  It would affect only a relatively 
small number of high-income people.  The relatively 
low tax rate could hardly be called burdensome to 
productive economic behavior or to high income 
taxpayers who would otherwise pay little or no tax.
Even if such an AMT did not produce large additional 
revenue, it would increase the perception and reality of 
fairness and honesty compared with the status quo of 
loopholes, avoidance, and evasion.
CED’s proposal of a hybrid system of VAT and income 
tax is sound, but does not realistically address the 
problems of fairness raised by the repeal of the AMT, 
since in practice the regular income tax is unlikely to be 
modified sufficiently to do so.   I therefore recommend 
that the CED proposal include such a simplified AMT.
With regard to complexity, the simple AMT could be 
implemented by adding just a few lines to Form 1040, 
without additional, complex schedules as at present.  
In addition, because this proposed AMT is somewhat 
progressive (because of the $100,000 exemption), it 
would moderate to a degree the political and social 
disadvantages of the VAT, which is by its very nature 
regressive.
IRS Enforcement   
I support the recommendation that additional political 
support and resources should be provided to the IRS, 
but believe it should be more explicit.  I believe the 
IRS budget and directives from the Congress should 
provide for a return of the audit rate to at least its 
historical level of about 1-2  percent (compared with 
0.6-0.8 percent recently) and should also permit a 
much deeper audit of questionable tax shelters and 
other strategies for tax avoidance.
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On several issues, as indicated,  
JAMES RIORDAN
[Comment #1 — General]  (pp. i, 1)
The report is a good contribution to the current debate 
on tax reform. It makes many important points:
1. The budget deficit needs to be reduced (but 
with more expense control and less tax increase 
than is recommended.)
2. The income tax is broken and needs to be 
reformed.  It is too complicated and has  
too many special provisions.  It is biased  
against savings.
3. We need a VAT (a new revenue source) in 
addition to an income tax to help us address 
points 1 and 2. (But the total program should 
be distributionally neutral and the reform 
of the income tax should eliminate the bias 
against savings and make the income tax 
simpler and more transparent.)
4. The Congressional budget process needs fixing 
and responsible implementation.
5. The tax legislative process needs fixing and 
responsible implementation.
6. The IRS should be appropriately funded 
and supported (and not burdened with 
the administration of business subsidies 
and welfare programs that are outside its 
competence.  Those programs—to the extent 
that they are needed—should be handled 
through the appropriation process and be 
administered by other agencies.)
[Comment #2 — Expenditure Control and Taxes]   
(pp. i, 3)
The report talks a good game about a war on all fronts 
to reduce the deficit, but fails to make clear the urgent 
need for prompt expenditure control, especially for 
medical and other entitlements.  There are no specific 
expense reduction suggestions in the report.  The 
report doubts that even a “restrained” projection of 
entitlement increases can be achieved.  Its primary 
thrust is for the prompt imposition of more total taxes 
than we have ever collected in peacetime.  A stated 
purpose is to “buy time” for future expense entitlement 
reductions that unfortunately are not described.   
The report calls for these higher taxes with no clearly 
stated cap. 
In my view it is impractical and unwise to suggest the 
federal government will or should collect more than 
20% of GDP in peacetime.  The report should have 
been built on that “inexorable” assumption along with 
the other “inexorable” assumptions that the report 
accepts.  That would have made it clear that we have 
no time to “buy time.”  We need to control entitlement 
expenditures now.  
[Comment #3 — Saving]  (pp. iii, 10)
The report’s criticism of many of the problems in the 
current income tax system is on target (if understated).  
Unfortunately, it is almost silent about a major 
(perhaps the major) failing of the income tax system—
its bias against saving.
The most disappointing aspect of the report is its 
failure to address the biased treatment of saving under 
the current income tax.  The report accepts as revealed 
wisdom the Haig Simons “comprehensive accrual” 
definition of taxable income (even though it recognizes 
that such a definition is inherently biased against 
saving).  Modern scholarship increasingly supports a 
“consumed income” approach as a better definition of 
the income tax base.  The issue is clearly developed in 
the book by David Bradford, Untangling the Income 
Tax, which was published under CED’s sponsorship.  
This report seems to me to ignore earlier research 
indicating that the income tax should be moved toward 
a consumed income approach. 
The tax on saved income should be deferred until that 
income is consumed (or gifted or bequeathed).  The tax 
treatment of saving is bound up with the tax treatment 
of capital income and the achievement of reasonable 
progressivity.  Our objective should be to achieve 
the desired level of progressivity without penalizing 
saving, and to do it in a way that makes the special 
treatment of capital income unnecessary.  (The special 
treatments of capital income now in the law are partial 
limited responses to the inherent bias against saving 
in the Haig Simons definition of income.)  There is 
no doubt that these special rules produce unwise and 
unnecessary complication and distortion, but they 
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have been made part of the law as a response to the 
fundamental bias against saving.  The bias would be 
even worse if we eliminated these special ameliorative 
treatments without fixing the basic problem.
[Comment #4 — Progressivity]  (pp. iii, 28)
The major policy recommendation of the report is the 
introduction of a VAT to provide the resources to help 
solve the deficit problem and reform the income tax.  
The report points out that a benefit of the VAT is that 
it is not biased against saving but is concerned that it 
will reduce the overall progressivity of the system.  The 
report naturally looks to the income tax to achieve the 
desired progressivity.  That progressivity, however, need 
not and should not be achieved by penalizing saving.  
Under a progressive system, high income taxpayers will 
pay at a higher rate than low earners, but progressivity 
should not require high income savers to pay more than 
high income consumers.
Progressivity in the income tax should be achieved 
as simply as possible—primarily through the rate 
structure of the income tax and not with drawbacks, 
hurdles, and take-aways.  Each section of the Internal 
Revenue Code does not need to be progressive.  The 
total system needs to be appropriately progressive.  
Benefits, as well as taxes, need to be considered.  
[Comment #5 — Specificity of Recommendations]   
(pp. iv, 33)
The report includes a number of specific 
recommendations for changes in the tax law...  
On balance, I think that it was a mistake to offer 
these specifics in this report.  We will soon have 
recommendations from the President’s Tax Reform 
Commission.  Hopefully, the Commission’s report 
will offer coherent alternatives developed after 
hearing comprehensive expert presentations.  The 
Commission’s recommendations will have been vetted 
by many expert and experienced tax specialists and 
administrators.  The specific recommendations in this 
report did not have the benefit of such a process.
The report’s recommendations do not represent a 
studied coherent package.  For example, over the years 
and especially in recent years, Congress has made a 
complete mess of the estate and gift taxes.  Sensible 
estate planning is all but impossible.  Under current 
law we will have three different regimes (each of them 
a mess) in place for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011.  
We clearly need a considered proposal that integrates 
the gift and estate taxes and deals with basis step-up 
of assets in a practical, sensible manner.  The report 
suggests possibly staying with the 2009 mess because 
it believes it is not as bad as the alternative 2010 or 
2011 messes.  I don’t think that recommendation is a 
contribution to tax reform.
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For more than 60 years, the Committee for Economic 
Development has been a respected influence on the for-
mation of business and public policy. CED is devoted 
to these two objectives: 
To develop, through objective research and informed discus-
sion, findings and recommendations for private and public 
policy that will contribute to preserving and strengthen-
ing our free society, achieving steady economic growth at 
high employment and reasonably stable prices, increasing 
productivity and living standards, providing greater and 
more equal opportunity for every citizen, and improving 
the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by present and 
future leaders in business, government, and education, and 
among concerned citizens, of the importance of these objec-
tives and the ways in which they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private voluntary contri-
butions from business and industry, foundations, and 
Objectives Of The Committee For Economic Development
individuals. It is independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan, 
and nonpolitical. 
Through this business-academic partnership, CED 
endeavors to develop policy statements and other 
research materials that commend themselves as guides 
to public and business policy; that can be used as texts 
in college economics and political science courses and 
in management training courses; that will be consid-
ered and discussed by newspaper and magazine editors, 
columnists, and commentators; and that are distributed 
abroad to promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system. 
CED believes that by enabling business leaders to 
demonstrate constructively their concern for the gen-
eral welfare, it is helping business to earn and maintain 
the national and community respect essential to the 
successful functioning of the free enterprise capitalist 
system.

Chairman
ROY J. BOSTOCK, Chairman
Sealedge Investments
Vice Chairmen
GEORGE H. CONRADES, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
JAMES A. JOHNSON, Vice Chairman
Perseus, LLC
ARTHUR F. RYAN, President, 
Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer
The Prudential Insurance Company of 
America
FREDERICK W. TELLING, Vice 
President, Corporate Strategic Planning 
and Policy Division
Pfizer Inc.
REX D. ADAMS, Professor of Business 
Administration
The Fuqua School of Business
Duke University
PAUL A. ALLAIRE, Retired Chairman
Xerox Corporation
HERBERT M. ALLISON, JR.
Chairman, President and CEO
TIAA-CREF
COUNTESS MARIA BEATRICE 
ARCO, Executive Vice President
American Asset Corporation
IAN ARNOF, Retired Chairman
Bank One, Louisiana, N.A.
JAMES S. BEARD, Retired President
Caterpillar Financial Services Corp.
THOMAS D. BELL, JR., Vice Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer
Cousins Properties Inc.
ALAN BELZER, Retired President and 
Chief Operating Officer
Allied-Signal Inc.
PETER A. BENOLIEL, Chairman 
Emeritus
Quaker Chemical Corporation
MELVYN E. BERGSTEIN, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Diamond Cluster International, Inc.
DEREK BOK, Professor
Harvard University
National Chair, Common Cause
LEE C. BOLLINGER, President
Columbia University
JACK O. BOVENDER, JR., Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
HCA Inc.
JOHN BRADEMAS, President Emeritus
New York University
WILLIAM E. BROCK, Chairman
Bridges Learning Systems, Inc.
ROBERT H. BRUININKS, President
University of Minnesota
* FLETCHER L. BYROM, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
MICASU Corporation
DONALD R. CALDWELL, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Cross Atlantic Capital Partners
DAVID A. CAPUTO, President
Pace University
RAYMOND G. CHAMBERS, Retired 
Chairman of the Board
Amelior Foundation
ROBERT CHESS, Chairman
Nektar Therapeutics
MICHAEL CHESSER, President, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Great Plains Energy Services
CAROLYN CHIN, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
Cebiz
* JOHN L. CLENDENIN, Retired 
Chairman
BellSouth Corporation
CED Board of Trustees
FERDINAND COLLOREDO-
MANSFELD, Partner
Cabot Properties, Inc.
DAVID M. COTE, Chairman, President 
and Chief Executive Officer
Honeywell International Inc.
DAVID CRANE, President and Chief 
Executive Officer
NRG Energy, Inc.
STEPHEN A. CRANE, Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer
Alpha Star Insurance Group Ltd.
DENNIS C. CUNEO, Senior Vice 
President
Toyota North America, Inc
W. BOWMAN CUTTER, Managing 
Director
Warburg Pincus LLC
PAUL DANOS, Dean
The Amos Tuck School of Business
Dartmouth College
RONALD R. DAVENPORT, Chairman 
of the Board
Sheridan Broadcasting Corporation
RICHARD H. DAVIS, Partner 
Davis Manafort, Inc.
RICHARD J. DAVIS, Partner
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
JOHN J. DEGIOIA, President
Georgetown University
JOHN DIEBOLD, Chairman
The Diebold Institute
SAMUEL A. DIPIAZZA, Global Chief 
Executive
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
LINDA M. DISTLERATH, Vice 
President, Global Health Policy
Merck & Co., Inc.
PATRICK DOLBERG, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
Holcim (US) Inc.
*Life Trustee

IRWIN DORROS, President
Dorros Associates
* FRANK P. DOYLE, Retired Executive 
Vice President
General Electric Company
ROBERT H. DUGGER, Managing 
Director
Tudor Investment Corporation
T. J. DERMOT DUNPHY, Chairman
Kildare Enterprises, LLC
CHRISTOPHER D. EARL, Managing 
Director
Perseus, LLC
W. D. EBERLE, Chairman
Manchester Associates, Ltd.
STUART E. EIZENSTAT, Partner,  
International Practice
Corington & Burling
ROBERT A. ESSNER, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
Wyeth
DIANA FARRELL, Director
McKinsey Global Institute
KATHLEEN FELDSTEIN, President
Economics Studies, Inc.
TREVOR FETTER, President and Chief 
Executive Officer
Temet Healthcare Corporation
MATTHEW FINK, Retired President
The Investment Company
*EDMUND B. FITZGERALD, 
Managing Director
Woodmont Associates
HARRY L. FREEMAN, Chairman
The Mark Twain Institute
MITCHELL S. FROMSTEIN, 
Chairman Emeritus
Manpower Inc.
CONO R. FUSCO, Managing Partner-
Strategic Relations 
Grant Thornton
PAMELA B. GANN, President 
Claremont McKenna College
JOSEPH GANTZ, Partner
GG Capital, LLC
E. GORDON GEE, Chancellor
Vanderbilt University
THOMAS P. GERRITY, Dean Emeritus
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
ALAN B. GILMAN, Chairman
The Steak n Shake Company
CAROL R. GOLDBERG, Trustee
The Goldberg Family Foundation
ALFRED G. GOLDSTEIN, President 
and Chief Executive Officer
AG Associates
JOSEPH T. GORMAN, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
TRW Inc.
EARL G. GRAVES, SR., Publisher and 
Chief Executive Officer
Earl G. Graves Publishing Co., Inc.
 GERALD GREENWALD, Managing 
Partner
Greenbriar Equity Group
BARBARA B. GROGAN, President
Western Industrial Contractors
PATRICK W. GROSS, Chairman,
The Lovell Group
Founder, AMS
JEROME H. GROSSMAN, M.D., 
Senior Fellow
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Chairman, Lion Gate Corporation
RONALD GRZYWINSKI, Chairman
ShoreBank Corporation
STEVEN GUNBY, Chairman, The 
Americas & Senior Vice President
The Boston Consulting Group, Inc.
JUDITH H. HAMILTON, Former 
President and Chief Executive Officer
Classroom Connect
WILLIAM A. HASELTINE, President
Haseltine Associates 
RICHARD H. HERSH, Former 
President
Trinity College
HEATHER R. HIGGINS, President
Randolph Foundation
RODERICK M. HILLS, Chairman
Hills & Stern, LLP
HAYNE HIPP, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
The Liberty Corporation
JOHN HOFMEISTER, President
Shell Oil Company
PAUL M. HORN, Senior Vice President, 
Research
IBM Corporation
PHILIP K. HOWARD, Vice Chairman
Covington & Burling
SHIRLEY ANN JACKSON, President
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
WILLIAM C. JENNINGS, Chairman
US Interactive, Inc.
JEFFREY A. JOERRES, Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer
Manpower Inc.
JAMES A. JOHNSON, Vice Chairman
Perseus, LLC
L. OAKLEY JOHNSON, Senior Vice 
President, Corporate Affairs
American International Group, Inc.
VAN E. JOLISSAINT,  
Corporate Economist
DaimlerChrysler Corporation
ROBERT L. JOSS, Dean
Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
PRES KABACOFF, Chief Executive 
Officer
HRI Properties
ROBERT KAHN, Director,
Country Risk Management
Citigroup Inc.
*Life Trustee
0
EDWARD A. KANGAS, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
JOSEPH E. KASPUTYS, Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer
Global Insight, Inc.
WILLIAM E. KIRWAN, Chancellor
University System of Maryland
THOMAS J. KLUTZNICK, President
Thomas J. Klutznick Company
CHARLES E.M. KOLB, President
Committee for Economic Development
EDWARD M. KOPKO, Chairman, 
President, and Chief Executive Officer
Butler International, Inc.
BENJAMIN LADNER, President
American University
THOMAS F. LAMB, JR., Senior Vice 
President, Government Affairs 
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
KURT M. LANDGRAF, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
Educational Testing Service
W. MARK LANIER, Partner
The Lanier Law Firm, P.C.
PAUL LAUDICINA, Vice President  
and Managing Director, 
A.T. Kearney Inc.
WILLIAM W. LEWIS, Director 
Emeritus
McKinsey Global Institute
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
ROBERT G. LIBERATORE, Group 
Senior Vice President, Global External 
Affairs
DaimlerChrysler Corporation
 IRA A. LIPMAN, Chairman of the 
Board and President
Guardsmark, LLC
JOHN LOOMIS, Vice President, 
Human Resources
General Electric Company
BRUCE K. MACLAURY, President 
Emeritus
The Brookings Institution
COLETTE MAHONEY, President 
Emeritus
Marymount Manhattan College
T. ALLAN MCARTOR, Chairman
Airbus of North America, Inc.
ALONZO L. MCDONALD, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Avenir Group, Inc.
E. MARIE McKEE, President & CEO
Steuben Glass
DAVID E. MCKINNEY, Vice Chair
Thomas J. Watson Foundation
LENNY MENDONCA, Chairman
McKinsey Global Institute
ALAN G. MERTEN, President
George Mason University
DEBORAH HICKS MIDANEK, 
President
Solon Group, Inc.
HARVEY R. MILLER, Vice Chairman
Greenhill & Co., LLC
ALFRED T. MOCKETT
NICHOLAS G. MOORE, Director
Bechtel Group, Inc.
DONNA MOREA, President
CGI-AMS, Inc.
IKUO MORI, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
Daiwa Securities America, Inc.
JAMES C. MULLEN, Chief Executive 
Officer
Biogen Inc.
DIANA S. NATALICIO, President
The University of Texas at El Paso
MATTHEW NIMETZ, Partner
General Atlantic Partners
DEAN R. O’HARE, Retired Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Chubb Corporation
RONALD L. OLSON, Partner
Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
NOBUHARU ONO, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
NTT DoCoMo USA
M. MICHEL ORBAN, Partner
RRE Ventures
HIDEAKI OTAKA, President and Chief 
Executive Officer
Toyota Motor North America, Inc.
 STEFFEN E. PALKO, Retired  
Vice Chairman and President
XTO Energy, Inc.
JERRY PARROTT, Vice President, 
Corporate Communications &  
Public Policy
Human Genome Sciences, Inc.
CAROL J. PARRY, President
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Associates
VICTOR A. PELSON, Senior Advisor
UBS Securities LLC
DONALD K. PETERSON, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Avaya Inc.
PETER G. PETERSON, Senior 
Chairman
The Blackstone Group
RALPH R. PETERSON, President, 
Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer
CH2M Hill Companies Ltd.
TODD E. PETZEL, President
Azimuth Alternative Asset Management 
LLP
HUGH B. PRICE, Former President and 
Chief Executive Officer
National Urban League
JAMES H. QUIGLEY, Chief Executive 
Officer
Deloitte & Touche
GEORGE A. RANNEY, JR., President 
and Chief Executive Officer
Chicago Metropolis 2020
*Life Trustee

NED REGAN, University Professor
The City University of New York
J.W. RHODES JR., Manager, Corporate 
Community Involvement
Chevron Corporation
JAMES Q. RIORDAN, Chairman
Quentin Partners Co.
E. B. ROBINSON, Former Chairman
Deposit Guaranty Corporation
JAMES D. ROBINSON, III, General 
Partner and Co-Founder
RRE Ventures
Chairman, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company
JAMES E. ROHR, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
ROY ROMER, Former Governor of 
Colorado
Superintendent, Los Angeles Unified 
School District
DANIEL ROSE, Chairman
Rose Associates, Inc.
LANDON H. ROWLAND, Chairman
Ever Glades Financial
NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, Chair, ArtStor 
Advisory Board
The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
GEORGE E. RUPP, President
International Rescue Committee
EDWARD B. RUST, JR., Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer
State Farm Insurance Companies
ARTHUR F. RYAN, President, 
Chairman and CEO
Prudential Financial
BERTRAM L. SCOTT, President
TIAA-CREF Life Insurance Company
TIAA-CREF
JOHN E. SEXTON, President
New York University
DONNA E. SHALALA, President
University of Miami
WALTER H. SHORENSTEIN, 
Chairman of the Board
Shorenstein Company LLC
* GEORGE P. SHULTZ, Distinguished 
Fellow
The Hoover Institution
Stanford University
JOHN C. SICILIANO, Director, Global 
Institutional Services
Dimensional Fund Advisors
RUTH J. SIMMONS, President
Brown University
FREDERICK W. SMITH, Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer
FedEx Corporation
JOHN F. SMITH, JR., Retired 
Chairman
General Motors Corporation
SARAH G. SMITH, Partner and Chief 
Accounting Officer
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
STEVEN SPECKER, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer
Electric Power Research Institute
ALAN G. SPOON, Managing General 
Partner
Polaris Venture Partners
JAMES D. STALEY, President and Chief 
Executive Officer
Roadway Corporation
YRC Regional Transportation
CHARLES R. STAMP, JR., Vice 
President, Public Affairs
Deere & Company
PAULA STERN, Chairwoman
The Stern Group, Inc.
 DONALD M. STEWART, Visiting 
Professor, Harris School of  
Public Policy
University of Chicago
ROGER W. STONE, Director
Stone-Kaplan Investments, LLC
MATTHEW J. STOVER, Chairman
LKM Ventures, LLC
LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, President
Harvard University
RICHARD F. SYRON, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer
Freddie Mac
HENRY TANG, Managing Partner
Committee of 100
FREDERICK W. TELLING, Ph.D.
Vice President
Pfizer, Inc.
JAMES A. THOMSON, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
RAND
 STEPHEN JOEL TRACHTENBERG, 
President
The George Washington University
TALLMAN TRASK, III, Executive Vice 
President
Duke University
ROBERT J. VILHAUER, Vice President, 
Public Policy and Analysis
The Boeing Company
JAMES L. VINCENT, Retired 
Chairman
Biogen, Inc.
CONNOR VLAKANCIC, Chief 
Executive Officer
5 STAR Group International, Inc.
FRANK VOGL, President
Vogl Communications
DONALD C. WAITE, III, Director
McKinsey & Company, Inc.
JERRY D. WEAST, Superintendent
Montgomery County Public Schools
ARNOLD R. WEBER, President 
Emeritus
Northwestern University
JOSH S. WESTON, Honorary 
Chairman
Automatic Data Processing, Inc.
HAROLD WILLIAMS, President 
Emeritus
The J. Paul Getty Trust 
*Life Trustee

LINDA SMITH WILSON, President 
Emerita
Radcliffe College
MARGARET S. WILSON, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Scarbroughs
H. LAKE WISE, Executive Vice 
President and Chief Legal Officer
Daiwa Securities America, Inc. 
JACOB J. WORENKLEIN, President 
and Chief Executive Officer
US Power Generating Co. LLC 
NANCY WYSENSKI, President and 
Chief Executive Officer
EMD Pharmaceuticals
KURT E. YEAGER, Former President 
and Chief Executive Officer
Electric Power Research Institute
RONALD L. ZARRELLA, Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
STEVE V. ZATKIN, Senior Vice 
President, Government Relations
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc.
EDWARD ZORE, President and Chief 
Executive Officer
Northwestern Mutual
*Life Trustee

RAY C. ADAM, Retired Chairman
NL Industries
ROBERT O. ANDERSON, Retired 
Chairman
Hondo Oil & Gas Company
ROY L. ASH
Los Angeles, California
ROBERT H. B. BALDWIN, Retired 
Chairman
Morgan Stanley Group Inc.
GEORGE F. BENNETT, Chairman 
Emeritus
State Street Investment Trust
HAROLD H. BENNETT
Salt Lake City, Utah
JACK F. BENNETT, Retired Senior Vice 
President
Exxon Corporation
HOWARD W. BLAUVELT
Keswick, Virginia
ALAN S. BOYD
Lady Lake, Florida
ANDREW F. BRIMMER, President
Brimmer & Company, Inc.
PHILIP CALDWELL, Retired 
Chairman
Ford Motor Company
HUGH M. CHAPMAN, Retired 
Chairman
NationsBank South
E. H. CLARK, JR., Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
The Friendship Group
A.W. CLAUSEN, Retired Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer
BankAmerica Corporation
DOUGLAS D. DANFORTH
Executive Associates
JOHN H. DANIELS, Retired Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Archer-Daniels Midland Co.
RALPH P. DAVIDSON
Washington, D.C.
CED Honorary Trustees
ALFRED C. DECRANE, JR., Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Texaco, Inc.
ROBERT R. DOCKSON, Chairman 
Emeritus
CalFed, Inc.
LYLE EVERINGHAM, Retired 
Chairman
The Kroger Co.
THOMAS J. EYERMAN, Retired 
Partner
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill
DON C. FRISBEE, Chairman Emeritus
PacifiCorp
RICHARD L. GELB, Chairman 
Emeritus
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
W. H. KROME GEORGE, Retired 
Chairman
ALCOA
WALTER B. GERKEN, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pacific Life Insurance Company
LINCOLN GORDON, Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution
JOHN D. GRAY, Chairman Emeritus
Hartmarx Corporation
JOHN R. HALL, Former Chairman
Ashland Inc.
RICHARD W. HANSELMAN, 
Chairman
Health Net Inc.
ROBERT S. HATFIELD, Retired 
Chairman
The Continental Group, Inc.
PHILIP M. HAWLEY, Retired 
Chairman of the Board
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc.
ROBERT C. HOLLAND, Senior Fellow
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
LEON C. HOLT, JR., Retired Vice 
Chairman
Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
SOL HURWITZ, Retired President
Committee for Economic Development
GEORGE F. JAMES
Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida
DAVID KEARNS, Chairman Emeritus
New American Schools
GEORGE M. KELLER, Retired 
Chairman of the Board
Chevron Corporation
FRANKLIN A. LINDSAY, Retired 
Chairman
Itek Corporation
ROBERT W. LUNDEEN, Retired 
Chairman
The Dow Chemical Company
RICHARD B. MADDEN, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Potlatch Corporation
AUGUSTINE R. MARUSI
Lake Wales, Florida
 WILLIAM F. MAY, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer
Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, 
Inc.
OSCAR G. MAYER, Retired Chairman
Oscar Mayer & Co.
GEORGE C. MCGHEE, Former U.S. 
Ambassador and Under Secretary of 
State
JOHN F. MCGILLICUDDY, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Chemical Banking Corporation
JAMES W. MCKEE, JR., Retired 
Chairman
CPC International, Inc.
CHAMPNEY A. MCNAIR, Retired 
Vice Chairman
Trust Company of Georgia
J. W. MCSWINEY, Retired Chairman of 
the Board
The Mead Corporation
ROBERT E. MERCER, Retired 
Chairman
The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

RUBEN F. METTLER, Retired 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
TRW Inc.
LEE L. MORGAN, Former Chairman of 
the Board
Caterpillar, Inc.
ROBERT R. NATHAN, Chairman
Nathan Associates, Inc.
J. WILSON NEWMAN, Retired 
Chairman
Dun & Bradstreet Corporation
JAMES J. O’CONNOR, Former 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Unicom Corporation
LEIF H. OLSEN, President
LHO GROUP
NORMA PACE, President
Paper Analytics Associates
CHARLES W. PARRY, Retired 
Chairman
ALCOA 
WILLIAM R. PEARCE, Director
American Express Mutual Funds
JOHN H. PERKINS, Former President
Continental Illinois National Bank and 
Trust Company
RUDOLPH A. PETERSON, President 
and Chief Executive Officer Emeritus
BankAmerica Corporation
DEAN P. PHYPERS
New Canaan, Connecticut
ROBERT M. PRICE, Former Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Control Data Corporation
JAMES J. RENIER
Renier & Associates
IAN M. ROLLAND, Former Chairman 
and Chief Executive Officer
Lincoln National Corporation
AXEL G. ROSIN, Retired Chairman
Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc.
WILLIAM M. ROTH
Princeton, New Jersey
WILLIAM RUDER
William Ruder Incorporated
RALPH S. SAUL, Former Chairman of 
the Board
CIGNA Companies
GEORGE A. SCHAEFER, Retired 
Chairman of the Board
Caterpillar, Inc.
ROBERT G. SCHWARTZ
New York, New York
MARK SHEPHERD, JR., Retired 
Chairman
Texas Instruments, Inc.
ROCCO C. SICILIANO
Beverly Hills, California
ELMER B. STAATS, Former Controller
General of the United States
FRANK STANTON, Former President
CBS, Inc.
EDGAR B. STERN, JR., Chairman of 
the Board
Royal Street Corporation
ALEXANDER L. STOTT
Fairfield, Connecticut
WAYNE E. THOMPSON, Past 
Chairman
Merritt Peralta Medical Center
THOMAS A. VANDERSLICE
TAV Associates
SIDNEY J. WEINBERG, JR., Senior 
Director
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
CLIFTON R. WHARTON, JR., Former 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
TIAA-CREF
DOLORES D. WHARTON, Former 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
The Fund for Corporate Initiatives, Inc.
ROBERT C. WINTERS, Chairman 
Emeritus
Prudential Insurance Company of 
America
RICHARD D. WOOD, Director
Eli Lilly and Company
CHARLES J. ZWICK
Coral Gables, Florida

CED Research Advisory Board
RALPH D. CHRISTY
J. Thomas Clark Professor
Department of Agricultural, Resource, and 
Managerial Economics
Cornell University
ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN
Marriner S. Eccles Professor of Public and 
Private Management
Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN
William Joseph Maier Professor of 
Political Economy
Harvard University
ROBERT W. HAHN
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute
HELEN F. LADD
Professor of Public Policy Studies and 
Economics
Sanford Institute of Public Policy
Duke University
ZANNY MINTON-BEDDOES
Washington Economics Correspondent
The Economist
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS
Sterling Professor of Economics
Cowles Foundation
Yale University
JOHN PALMER
Professor and Dean Emeritus 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs 
Syracuse University
RUDOLPH G. PENNER
Senior Fellow
The Urban Institute
CECILIA E. ROUSE
Professor of Economics and Public Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
HAL VARIAN
Class of 1944 Professor of Information 
and Management Systems
Haas School of Business
University of California, Berkeley
JOHN P. WHITE
Lecturer in Public Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

CED Professional and Administrative Staff
CHARLES E.M. KOLB
President
 
Research
JOSEPH J. MINARIK
Senior Vice President and Director of 
Research
DONNA DESROCHERS
Vice President and Director of Education 
Studies
ELLIOT SCHWARTZ
Vice President and Director of 
International Studies
VAN DOORN OOMS
Senior Fellow
CAROLYN CADEI
Research Associate
RACHEL DUNSMOOR
Research Associate
Advisor on International
Economic Policy
ISAIAH FRANK
William L. Clayton Professor of 
International Economics
The Johns Hopkins University
Communications/Government Relations
MICHAEL J. PETRO
Vice President and Director of Business 
and Government Relations and Chief 
of Staff
MORGAN BROMAN
Director of Communications
CHRIS DREIBELBIS
Business and Government Policy 
Associate
CHRISTINE RYAN
Program Director
ROBIN SAMERS
Director of Trustee Relations
JENNIFER SEGAL
Development Associate/ Grants 
Administrator
RACHEL PILLIOD
Communications and Outreach Associate
Development
MARTHA E. HOULE
Vice President for Development and 
Secretary of the Board of Trustees
 
RICHARD M. RODERO
Director of Development
KATIE McCALLUM
Development Associate/ Corporate 
Relations
Finance and Administration
LAURIE LEE
Chief Financial Officer and Vice President 
of Finance and Administration
JERI McLAUGHLIN
Executive Assistant to the President
JEFFREY SKINNER
Senior Accountant/Grants Administrator
AMANDA TURNER
Office Manager
JANVIER RICHARDS
Membership and Administrative Assistant

Statements On National Policy Issued By The Committee For Economic 
Development
Selected Recent Publications:
Cracks in the Education Pipeline: A Business Leader’s Guide to Higher Education Reform (2005)
The Emerging Budget Crisis: Urgent Fiscal Choices (2005)
Making Trade Work: Straight Talk on Jobs, Trade, and Adjustments (2005)
Building on Reform: A Business Proposal to Strengthen Election Finance (2005)
Developmental Education: The Value of High Quality Preschool Investments as Economic Tools (2004)
A New Framework for Assessing the Benefits of Early Education (2004)
Promoting Innovation and Economic Growth: The Special Problem of Digital Intellectual Property (2004)
Investing in Learning: School Funding Policies to Foster High Performance (2004)
Promoting U.S. Economic Growth and Security Through Expanding World Trade: A Call for Bold American 
Leadership (2003) 
Reducing Global Poverty: Engaging the Global Enterprise (2003)
Reducing Global Poverty: The Role of Women in Development (2003) 
How Economies Grow: The CED Perspective on Raising the Long-Term Standard of Living (2003)
Learning for the Future: Changing the Culture of Math and Science Education to Ensure a Competitive 
Workforce (2003)
Exploding Deficits, Declining Growth: The Federal Budget and the Aging of America (2003) 
Justice for Hire: Improving Judicial Selection (2002)
A Shared Future: Reducing Global Poverty (2002)
A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for Business (2002)
Preschool For All: Investing In a Productive and Just Society (2002)
From Protest to Progress: Addressing Labor and Environmental Conditions Through Freer Trade (2001)
The Digital Economy: Promoting Competition, Innovation, and Opportunity (2001)
Reforming Immigration: Helping Meet America’s Need for a Skilled Workforce (2001)
Measuring What Matters: Using Assessment and Accountability to Improve Student Learning (2001)
Improving Global Financial Stability (2000)
The Case for Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China (2000)
Welfare Reform and Beyond: Making Work Work (2000)
Breaking the Litigation Habit: Economic Incentives for Legal Reform (2000)
New Opportunities for Older Workers (1999)
Investing in the People’s Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform (1999)
The Employer’s Role in Linking School and Work (1998)
Employer Roles in Linking School and Work: Lessons from Four Urban Communities (1998)
America’s Basic Research: Prosperity Through Discovery (1998)
Modernizing Government Regulation: The Need For Action (1998)
U.S. Economic Policy Toward The Asia-Pacific Region (1997)
Connecting Inner-City Youth To The World of Work (1997)
Fixing Social Security (1997)
Growth With Opportunity (1997)

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Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and independent, nonpolitical research 
organizations in other countries. Such counterpart groups are composed of business executives and scholars and 
have objectives similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED cooperates with 
these organizations on research and study projects of common interest to the various countries concerned. This 
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